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JUDGES BREAKING THE LAW: AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF FINANCIALLY INTERESTED JUDGES 
DECIDING CASES* 
BENJAMIN B. JOHNSON** AND JOHN NEWBY PARTON*** 
We present the first extensive study of nonrecusals by federal district judges and 
report two key empirical findings. First, we found seventy-five judges 
participated in over 200 total cases despite owning stock in one of the parties to 
the litigation, a clear violation of both statutory law and judicial ethics. As we 
used a very conservative methodology and did not review every judge, this is a 
lower bound on recusal failures. Second, we found judges employ very different 
strategies when deciding whether to recuse due to a potential financial conflict 
of interest. This variability signals two distinct problems: the current rules as to 
when a judge should or should not recuse are unclear, and as a result, judges fail 
to recuse when they should and also recuse when they should not. This suggests 
a clear need for reform. 
We provide a theoretical framework to evaluate judicial recusal policies due to 
financial relationships. We identify a trade-off between two core concerns of the 
judiciary: fairness and legitimacy. Fairness considerations suggest treating a 
judge’s financial interests in a party like other relationships that judges have with 
litigants, lawyers, or witnesses. Legitimacy concerns urge a carve out for 
particular types of financial interests that would lead observers to think a judge 
could be acting to advance their own financial interests. These suggestions 
represent both a fundamental reorientation of existing recusal law and theory 
and a practical solution to a fundamental problem that has gone unobserved for 
too long. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he 
believe that he has received justice. A judge, like Caesar’s wife, should be above 
suspicion.”1 
On June 8, 2012, Emelda and Raymond Lopez filed a lawsuit against Wells 
Fargo.2 Judge A3 was initially assigned to the case.4 Four days later, Judge A 
recused himself sua sponte under the statute governing recusals, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455 (“recusal statute”), 5  finding that he had a “financial interest” in the 
defendant “through ownership of shares in three mutual funds owned by a 
 
 1. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 544 (8th Cir. 1972). 
 2. Lopez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 12-cv-01492, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164893, at *1 (D. 
Colo. Nov. 19, 2012). 
 3. In this Article, the authors have chosen to anonymize the names of judges used in their review. 
The purpose of this is to ensure the audience can properly focus on the larger, systemic issues with the 
recusal system rather than the actions of individual judges. However, relevant cases are cited to provide 
enough information to allow for replication and further review. 
 4. See Order of Recusal at 1–2, Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164893, at *1 (No. 12-cv-01492) 
[hereinafter Order of Recusal June 12] (showing Judge A as the presiding judge who recused on June 
12, 2012). 
 5. 28 U.S.C. § 455. 
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securities affiliate” of Wells Fargo.6 According to his financial disclosure report, 
Judge A also had three checking accounts at Wells Fargo.7 The case was then 
assigned to Judge B. 8  After she notified the parties that she had “various 
business associations with Wells Fargo Bank,” Emelda and Raymond requested 
her recusal. 9 Judge B recused, citing her “business relationships with Wells 
Fargo” and the plaintiffs’ concerns.10 The case was then assigned to Judge C,11 
who, according to his financial disclosure report, owned between $15,000 and 
$50,000 in Wells Fargo bonds and less than $15,000 in Wells Fargo stock.12 
Within a week, Judge C, acting sua sponte, struck the complaint.13 
In this one case, we observe three different judges applying three different 
standards as to the level of financial involvement that requires recusal. 
Problematically, none of the three judges actually followed the law. The recusal 
statute requires a judge to recuse whenever he14 has a “financial interest” in the 
subject matter of the litigation or one of the parties.15 The recusal statute defines 
a “financial interest” as “ownership of a legal or equitable interest . . . [in] a 
party,” but it carves out exceptions for ownership through mutual funds and 
deposit accounts in “a mutual savings association, or a similar proprietary 
interest . . . only if the outcome of the proceeding could [not] substantially 
affect the value of the interest.”16 
Judge A owned shares of mutual funds owned by an affiliate of Wells 
Fargo. 17  This is not an ownership interest in Wells Fargo; it is incredibly 
unlikely that a judgment for or against Wells Fargo would affect the value of 
A’s mutual funds, and thus A’s mutual funds are explicitly not financial interests 
requiring recusal according to the recusal statute.18 Judge B recused because of 
 
 6. Order of Recusal June 12, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 7. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2012, at 4–5 (2013) [hereinafter Judge A, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT 2012], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeAFinDisRep2012 [https://perma.cc/5GJC-7FPG]. 
 8. See Order of Recusal at 1–2, Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164893, at *1 (No. 12-cv-01492) 
[hereinafter Order of Recusal June 22] (showing Judge B as the presiding judge who recused on June 
22, 2012). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Minute Order Regarding Docket #10 at 1–2, Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164893, at *1 
(No. 12-cv-01492) (showing Judge C as the presiding judge who recused on June 28, 2012). 
 12. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2012, at 12, 17 (2013) [hereinafter Judge C, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT 2012], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeCFinDisRep2012 [https://perma.cc/RS8X-VGTW]. 
 13. Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164893, at *2–3. 
 14. The recusal statute uses masculine pronouns when speaking of judges. 
 15. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4); see also RICHARD E. FLAMM, RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF 
JUDGES: FOR CAUSE MOTIONS, PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES AND APPEALS 238 (Banks & Jordan 
L. Publ’g Co. ed., 2020). 
 16. § 455(d)(4). 
 17. Order of Recusal June 12, supra note 4, at 1. 
 18. § 455(d)(4). 
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her “business associations” with Wells Fargo. 19  Insofar as these business 
associations are checking and savings accounts,20 they are also not “financial 
interests” according to the plain text of the recusal statute.21 Judge B’s line of 
credit would also fall outside of the recusal statute, since one does not own a 
legal interest in a bank by taking out a loan. Thus, Judge B had no disqualifying 
financial interest in Wells Fargo. Finally, the one judge who did have a clear 
disqualifying financial interest—stock ownership—in Wells Fargo was Judge 
C.22 The only judge who should have recused was the only judge who did not. 
This single case demonstrates three distinct problems with the current 
recusal system. First and most obviously, some judges are deciding cases even 
though they have a statutory obligation to disqualify themselves. Perhaps the 
most striking finding in this Article is the astounding frequency with which 
judges fail to recuse themselves when they have a legal obligation to do so. We 
found over 200 instances where a judge owned stock in a party and still 
participated in the case.23 
The second problem revealed in Lopez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.24 is that 
judges sometimes recuse themselves when there is no legal reason to do so. This 
problem is fundamentally similar to the first. In both instances, judges are 
failing to follow the recusal statute, but the harm from the second is less 
obvious. Judges who fail to recuse when they should put the fairness of a given 
proceeding at risk. On the other hand, judges who recuse when they should not 
undermine the random assignment of judges by changing the probabilities that 
other judges will be selected. The pervasive upending of random assignment 
threatens the fairness of the judicial system both to litigants and to judges. The 
problem is not simply that one judge is unavailable to hear one particular case. 
Parties with publicly traded securities are usually repeat litigants, and many 
judges are overly conservative in their recusal practices. This significantly alters 
the mix of available judges for some—but not all—parties across a large number 
of cases. 
The third problem is that, aside from stock ownership, there is no clear 
standard for what constitutes a “financial interest” requiring a judge to recuse. 
Three different judges applied three different standards in the same case despite 
all being bound by the same legal and ethical obligations. We argue that there 
 
 19. Order of Recusal June 22, supra note 8, at 1. 
 20. Notice of Disclosure at 1, Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164893, at *1 (No. 12-cv-01492) 
(showing Judge B as the presiding judge disclosing a potential financial interest on June 13, 2012). 
 21. See § 455(d)(4). 
 22. Judge C, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2012, supra note 12, at 11–12, 16. 
 23. See discussion infra Parts I–II; BENJAMIN B. JOHNSON & JOHN NEWBY PARTON, RECUSAL 
FAILURES SPREADSHEET (2020), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Recusal_Failures_Spreadsheet.xlsx [https://perma.cc/2S89-M88H]. 
 24. No. 12-cv-01492, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164893 (D. Colo. Nov. 19, 2012). 
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should be a clear standard balancing the risk of perceived bias against the need 
to maintain a functioning and fair judicial system. 
This Article is built around the first empirical study of federal district 
court judicial recusal practices. 25  We first show that, in hundreds of cases, 
dozens of judges are breaking the law and violating their ethical obligations by 
participating in cases where they own stock in a company.26 This clear and 
concerning finding is glaring evidence of a much larger problem: the legal 
standards governing judicial recusal are grossly inadequate, and judges often 
ignore them. In the remainder of the Article, we demonstrate that judges 
employ a wide range of standards for recusal based on financial links to parties. 
We suggest that this state of affairs results both from unclear, insufficient 
standards and from institutional rules designed to obscure whether judges are 
following the rules. This lack of clarity and accountability undermines the 
legitimacy of the judiciary as a whole. 
This Article adds to a growing empirical literature that examines recusal. 
For example, a recent state-level empirical study demonstrated that voluntary 
recusal rules alone are generally inadequate to induce recusal for campaign-
finance-related conflicts.27 We find much the same to be true at the federal 
level, at least whenever a potential conflict arises. Another recent empirical 
study of federal appellate judges points out the effects of actually enforcing 
recusal rules.28 Because certain types of judges are likely to own stocks, those 
types of judges are more likely to recuse.29 This means that the set of available 
judges to hear cases from blue-chip companies looks quite different from the 
universe of federal judges at large.30 We expand on this observation to explain 
 
 25. JOHNSON & PARTON, supra note 22. There are some studies on federal appellate judge 
recusals. See, e.g., Reity O’Brien, Kytja Weir & Chris Young, Federal Judges Plead Guilty, CTR. 
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/04/28/14630/federal-judges-plead-guilty 
[https://perma.cc/8EMQ-SUU8] (Aug. 5, 2014, 10:39 AM) (explaining that there were twenty-four 
cases where circuit court judges owned stock in a party to the case); see also Joe Stephens, Ethics Lapses 
by Federal Judges Persist, Review Finds, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/17/AR2006041701296_pf.html [https://perma.cc/X7MD-L4BS (dark 
archive)] (studying stock conflicts involving federal appellate judges). 
 26. See generally JOHNSON & PARTON, supra note 23 (listing cases that judges participated in 
despite possessing financial conflicts). 
 27. See Jonathan S. Krasno, Donald P. Green, Costas Panagopoulos, Dane Thorley & Michael 
Scwam-Baird, Campaign Donations, Judicial Recusal, and Disclosure: A Field Experiment, J. POL. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1–2) (on file with authors). 
 28. See generally James M. Anderson, Eric Helland & Merritt McAlister, Measuring How Stock 
Ownership Affects Which Judges and Justices Hear Cases, 103 GEO. L.J. 1163 (2015) (discussing the 
consequences of judicial recusals). 
 29. See id. at 1201–02, 1210 (finding that recusals from direct stock ownership results in a pool of 
remaining judges to hear “cases involving corporate litigation [that is] more likely to [be comprised of] 
male judges, African-American judges, younger judges, judges with fewer personal assets, judges 
appointed by a Republican president, and judges that were former law professors”). 
 30. See id. 
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how recusal undermines the random assignment of judges that is crucial to 
legitimating the judicial system. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, after describing our data, we 
lay out our key empirical findings: (1) clear evidence of judicial lawbreaking in 
cases with stock ownership, and (2) the muddle of recusal practice in nonstock 
cases. 
Part II examines the financial disclosure and recusal process as well as the 
current legal and ethical requirements that govern judicial recusals. We show 
how confusing and inadequate the existing rules are. For example, a judge who 
owns a stock must recuse, but a judge who engages in riskier securities trading 
on the same share of stock (for example, selling short or purchasing a put or call 
option) does not need to recuse. 
Part III builds a theory to evaluate recusal policy. Key to the analysis is 
the role of random assignment in the legal process. Some judges will be more 
likely to rule in favor of businesses than others, and case outcomes will be 
affected by which judge parties draw. 31  Given the inherent bias of human 
decision makers, the fairness of the system relies on the luck of the draw. Parties 
deserve a fair shot at drawing more or less probusiness judges. Recusals upset 
this balance. If a judge’s probusiness proclivities correlate with their financial 
relationships, recusal will remove a disproportionate share of probusiness judges 
and some parties will have a smaller chance of drawing a probusiness judge. 
Such an outcome undermines the fairness of the system. This concern must be 
balanced against traditional fairness considerations which require judges to 
recuse when they have “a personal bias . . . concerning a party.”32 The key is to 
determine whether the extant relationship is one that could bias a judge in favor 
of a party. 
Part IV considers policy reform. Our proposal is threefold. First, establish 
clear rules. Second, publish judges’ financial disclosure filings and automate 
case assignment. Third, maintain a list of recusal failures modeled on the Six-
Month List created by the Civil Justice Reform Act.33 The recusal statute and 
Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges (“Code of Conduct”) are concerned with 
 
 31. See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2009) 
(finding that randomized case assignments lead to randomized outcomes due to differences in 
competence and ideology). 
 32. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). 
 33. See Civil Justice Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101–106, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified 
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482). The Six-Month List provision is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 476(a). 
See also Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Six-Month List and 
the Unintended Consequences of Judicial Accountability, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 367 (2020). The Six-
Month List includes motions that were filed more than six months ago, bench trials submitted more 
than six months ago, cases pending more than three years, and bankruptcy and Social Security appeals 
pending more than six months. Id. at 367 n.12. The judges associated with these cases are identified 
publicly. Id. at 367. Colloquially, the Six-Month List is known as the “Report of Shame,” and judges 
try very hard to stay off of it. See id. at 375 & n.47. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2020) 
2020] JUDGES BREAKING THE LAW 7 
eliminating the perception of bias, and therefore they require recusal under 
certain circumstances.34 Judges who do not recuse when they should do so fail 
in their legal obligation under the recusal statute. What is more, while judges 
have a statutory and ethical obligation to make themselves aware of their 
financial holdings, people can and do make good faith mistakes. We do not 
mean to presume bad faith, but the prevalence of recusal failures and the vast 
range of recusal practices suggest that reform is desperately needed. 
I.  DATA, METHODS, AND FINDINGS 
Our study combines information from three sources. We began with a set 
of financial disclosure reports filed by district court judges.35 In order to detect 
conflicts, we then compared those reports to two different databases of docket 
sheets: 36  www.justia.com (“Justia”) 37  and www.bloomberglaw.com 
(“Bloomberg Law”).38  
The Ethics in Government Act of 197839 requires federal judges to make 
financial disclosures via annual reports.40 The recusal statute requires judges to 
disclose their own and their close family members’ (spouse and dependent 
children) different types of financial relationships, including information about 
assets and entities that generate income (including reimbursements). 41  The 
recusal statute also requires judges to disclose liabilities such as credit card debt, 
mortgage information, or student loans.42 The disclosure requirements that deal 
with assets, however, are most relevant to recusals. The assets that must be 
disclosed include the stocks, bonds, funds, trusts, and accounts (money market, 
checking, and savings) held by the judge, spouse, or children.43 While disclosure 
requires the names of the assets, the exact value of the investments is not 
 
 34. See § 455(b)(1); 2 JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, pt. A (2019) 
[hereinafter GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, CODE OF CONDUCT], https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/code_of_conduct_for_united_states_judges_effective_march_12_2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/2TYK-AKAS]; § 476(a); Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 
(1988). 
 35. Financial disclosure reports were obtained from Judicial Watch. JUD. WATCH, 
https://www.judicialwatch.org/ [https://perma.cc/XQS6-ZXT4]. 
 36. We used two sources in an effort to be more comprehensive. The Bloomberg dataset appears 
to contain more cases, but it associates only the final judge to a case. Justia did not have every case, but 
it did associate more than one judge with a case. We checked both in an effort to capture more conflicts. 
Neither dataset is perfect, so we likely missed additional conflicts. Thus, our results should be 
considered a lower bound on the number of actual recusal failures. 
 37. Dockets & Filings, JUSTIA, https://dockets.justia.com/ [https://perma.cc/6893-748H]. 
 38. BLOOMBERG L., https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ [https://perma.cc/66VE-9ZG8]. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824–67 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–505). 
 40. See 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–104 (outlining the annual financial disclosure requirements for 
judicial officers and other federal government employees). 
 41. Id. § 102. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
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required.44 Instead, judges must disclose that the investment falls within a given 
range.45 The same is true of the amount of income generated by assets.46 For 
example, a judge who received $1,100 in dividends from a $45,000 investment 
in Verizon stock would report making $1,001–$2,500 in income from dividends 
paid on Verizon stock valued at $15,001–$50,000.47 
The annual reports we use in our study are financial disclosure reports 
publicly available through Judicial Watch an organization which describes itself 
as “a conservative, non-partisan educational foundation” that “promotes 
transparency, accountability and integrity in government” and “advocates high 
standards of ethics . . . to ensure that political and judicial officials do not abuse 
the powers entrusted to them by the American people.”48 These disclosures are 
technically public documents available from the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts (“AO”). 49  However, all requests must identify the name, 
occupation, and address of the requestor.50 The requestor is then permitted to 
view the financial disclosure report by appointment in the Financial Disclosure 
Office of the AO.51 The judge is then told who is requesting the report. 52 
Obviously, lawyers may be hesitant to inquire about a judge’s finances 
midlitigation.53 
We studied disclosures for more than six hundred judges filed for the years 
2009–12.54 Importantly, the data on Judicial Watch is incomplete, such that we 
have information for only some years for some judges. Similarly, some financial 
disclosure reports that we do have are redacted or unclear. While our data is not 
 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. § 102(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ix) (providing the categorial ranges for items of income that must 
be reported). 
 48. About Judicial Watch, JUD. WATCH, https://www.judicialwatch.org/about/#mission 
[https://perma.cc/5GD2-LU3U]. 
 49. 2 JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, pt. D, § 540.10(a) (2018) 
[hereinafter GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE], https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/guide-vol02d.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GTJ-UMLL] (deriving the guidelines from 5 
U.S.C. app. §§ 101–111). 
 50. Id. § 540(c)(1). 
 51. Id. § 540.10. 
 52. Id. § 540.30(a). 
 53. Associated Press, Inside Washington: In the Digital Age, Federal Judges’ Financial Reports Still Only 
on Paper, FOX NEWS, https://www.foxnews.com/us/inside-washington-in-the-digital-age-federal-
judges-financial-reports-still-only-on-paper [https://perma.cc/9BML-BCQW] (Nov. 17, 2014) 
(“There’s a disincentive [for] litigants and other interested parties to ask for a particular judge’s 
financial disclosure form . . . .”). 
 54. We used Judicial Watch because it provided immediately available financial disclosure reports 
and contained the vast majority of possible reports within the parameters of our empirical study. 
JOHNSON & PARTON, supra note 23. The above-mentioned barriers to receiving reports firsthand from 
the AO made it impractical source of data. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
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perfect, we stress that these data limitations mean we are more likely to have 
undercounted financial conflicts. 
We began with a universe of more than 1,100 judges who served in the 
district courts during at least a portion of 2009–12, including inactive and senior 
judges. 55 We do not normally expect to find disclosure reports for periods 
before judges began their judgeships, for the year a judge vacates (as many 
judges vacate only upon death), or for periods after they vacated.56 Finally, we 
do not expect to find reports from judges who did not hear a single case in a 
given year—nor would these reports be interesting to us, as they could not 
possibly contain financial conflicts. That the vast majority of the reports were 
available increased our confidence in the data source. 
We compared information from the financial disclosures with docket 
sheets from two different databases. First, we wrote computer code to 
automatically download information from Justia. Justia provides case-level 
information such as judges, parties, case types, venue, docket number, and filing 
data. We searched for and automatically downloaded case information for 
judges in our study for the years 2009–12. Second, we manually searched 
Bloomberg Law by party and judge over our time period to capture any cases 
where a judge participated in a case in which they had a financial relationship 
with a party. 
Identifying recusal failures and proper recusals is not always 
straightforward. Judges sometimes recuse themselves after they have 
participated in a case, recuse and then vacate the recusal order despite still 
having a financial interest in a party to the case,57 or recuse after the case has 
 
 55. For a searchable list of all federal judges, see Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 
1789–Present, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges [https://perma.cc/Y4SG-8XMW]. 
To replicate our set, download the full list of judges by selecting “Download an Export,” then “Export 
organized by judge (Excel workbook).” Then, sort the Excel sheet by “Court Type (1)” and delete all 
entries that are not U.S. District Court. Then, sort the remaining entries by “Commission Date (1)” 
and delete all entries commissioned in 2013 or later. Finally, sort the remaining entries by “Termination 
Date (1)” and delete all entries terminated in 2008 and before. We counted 1,139 district court judges 
with a commission date of December 31, 2012, or before, and a termination date (if any) of January 1, 
2009, or after. 
 56. According to the data from the Federal Judicial Center, from 2009–12, 120 district court 
judges vacated. Of the 120 who vacated, 72 died, 33 resigned or retired, and 14 were appointed to 
another judicial position. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search [https://perma.cc/FH3C-NXAE] (using 
advanced search criteria of all U.S. District Courts, termination date between January 1, 2009, and 
December 31, 2012, and termination type). For additional information on what causes judges to leave 
the district court, see data from the Federal Judicial Center database. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Order of Recusal at 1, Balkema v. Wachovia Sec., LLC., No. 11-412, 2011 WL 
2633617 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2013) [hereinafter Order of Recusal September 13] (showing Judge D as 
the presiding judge who recused on September 13, 2011); Order Vacating Order of Recusal at 1, 
Balkema, 2011 WL 2633617 (No. 11-cv-00412) [hereinafter Order Vacating Order of Recusal 
September 16] (showing Judge D vacating his preceding order of recusal on September 16, 2011). On 
September 2, 2011, Judge D purchased somewhere between $250,001 and $500,000 in Wells Fargo 
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concluded.58 Some judges also fail to report some of the required information 
about the dates of asset ownership, leading to ambiguity about whether a 
conflict existed within a particular case. 59  Further, limitations in our 
methodology have almost certainly caused us to overlook conflicts.60 
The relevant question that guided our research is whether a judge 
participated in a case where the judge had financial links to one of the parties. 
Participation, for our purposes, means the entry of any order other than one 
recusing or transferring the case to another district judge. We found it both 
difficult and unnecessary to parse different orders for several reasons. Not all 
orders are created equal (such as, granting summary judgment is dispositive 
while an order allowing counsel to proceed pro hac vice is not). Also, though 
some motions are formally dispositive, earlier orders that set the metes and 
bounds of the case might be effectively dispositive. For example, refusing 
discovery on an issue might make it impossible to prevail, and the plaintiff 
might drop the suit rather than waste money continuing a hopeless cause. But 
our question is whether judges are following the rules. We are not asking 
whether failure to follow the rules affected case outcomes, although that is 
 
securities. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011, at 5 (2012) [hereinafter Judge D, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT 2011], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeDFinDisRep2011 [https://perma.cc/W3XQ-N63N]. This 
demonstrates financial ties between Judge D and Wells Fargo immediately prior to his order of recusal, 
see Order of Recusal September 13, supra, and persisting before and after Judge D issued an order 
vacating his order of recusal, see Order Vacating Order of Recusal September 16, supra. Wells Fargo 
also purchased Wachovia in 2008. Sara Lepro, Wells Fargo Buys Wachovia for $15.1 Billion, 
ABC NEWS (Oct. 3, 2008), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/SmartHome/story?id=5946486&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/A2MD-2T32]. 
 58. See infra notes 112–18 and accompanying text. 
 59. For example, we identified fifteen recusal failures by Judge H. See infra notes 85–89 and 
accompanying text. However, his 2009, 2010, and 2011 financial disclosure reports were incomplete, 
and his 2012 financial disclosure report was unavailable. See Document Archives, JUD. WATCH, 
https://tinyurl.com/JudgeHFinDisRep2012 [https://perma.cc/W8V3-ZHX6]; infra notes 85–89 and 
accompanying text. Therefore, we could not conduct further research. 
 60. For example, Bloomberg Law’s search engine does not identify all judges who presided over 
a single case; instead, it identifies only the judge who most recently presided over a case. Compare 
Results for Dockets, BLOOMBERG L., https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/search/results/ 
91f4b497dbf881443c4837335dd2dfdd [https://perma.cc/KW32-S27J (dark archive)] (showing that the 
results of a Bloomberg Law search for Judge A do not include Lopez), with Order of Recusal June 12, 
supra note 4 (showing Judge A as presiding judge in Lopez). Thus, hypothetically, if a judge improperly 
decides some motions in the case, then recuses, and the case is assigned to and decided by a second 
judge, Bloomberg Law will identify the second judge as the only judge associated with the case. Id. As 
a result, we would miss the first judge’s recusal failure. Furthermore, we also miss improper recusals. 
If a judge recuses when they should not, we will miss that recusal if the case is assigned to a different 
judge in the Bloomberg Law data. Id. 
Another limitation of our review process is our early use of a computer program to help us flag 
the names of companies that appeared both in a judge’s disclosure reports and in that judge’s case 
history. Because the computer conversion from PDF to text was imperfect, this method failed to flag 
all conflicts for manual review. Accordingly, we manually coded financial disclosure reports in later 
stages of our study. 
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obviously an interesting and important question. Since we are simply interested 
in whether judges broke the rules, the magnitude of the failure is only of second-
order concern and thus order type (other than recusal or transfer) is irrelevant. 
Only counting orders as improper participation is a conservative measure 
of recusal failure. There are instances where parties voluntarily withdraw before 
the judge has ruled on any motions, yet the judge may have improperly 
participated and failed to recuse. For example, judges can send signals at initial 
hearings (before any order is entered) that a party will lose, thus causing the 
party to voluntarily withdraw.61 We implicitly treat these cases as recusals, 
effectively assuming the judge did not improperly participate (since “signals” 
will not appear on docket sheets)62 and would have recused had the party not 
voluntarily withdrawn. Similarly, when multidistrict litigation was transferred 
from a conflicted judge to another district, we generally did not count this as a 
recusal failure even though the failure to recuse from these cases is arguably a 
violation of the recusal statute. We are therefore putting forward a conservative 
count of the number of failures to recuse. 
Finally, our study will fail to pick up some instances where a judge’s 
financial stake has a clear effect on proceedings. For instance, consider the order 
in Kruse Technology Partnership v. Daimler AG.63 Judge E recused himself in 
several cases where he owned stock in a party.64 But in Kruse, Judge E posted 
the following notice: 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO RECUSE 
This is one of several actions brought by Kruse Technology Partnership 
(“Kruse”), and was assigned to Judge [E] as a related case. (Local Rule 
83-1.3.) There are obvious efficiencies in having one judge deal with the 
 
 61. Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 232 (2002) (explaining that 
pretrial conferences allow for opportunities in which “[t]he court may ‘signal’ the likely result with a 
not too subtle query”). 
 62. See id. at 254 (“Most signaling occurs off the record and often takes place in private 
chambers.”). 
 63. No. 10-cv-01066, 2012 WL 12888668 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2012). 
 64. See Order to Reassign Case Due to Self-Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 
08-05, Wise v. Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n, No. 11-cv-00905 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2013); Order Rescinding 
Order re Transfer, Network Signatures Inc. v. Safeway Inc., No. 11-cv-10663 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 
2012); Order to Reassign Case Due to Self-Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05, 
Gonzales v. Bank of Am. N.A., No. 10-cv-01453 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2010); Order to Reassign Case 
Due to Self-Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05, Zambrano v. Bank of Am. N.A., 
No. 10-cv-01155 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2010); Order to Reassign Case Due to Self-Recusal Pursuant to 
Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05, Clevely v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-cv-00912 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 
2009); Order to Reassign Case Due to Self-Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05, 
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. J.W. Burch & Sons Inc., No. 09-cv-00476 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009); Order 
to Reassign Case Due to Self-Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05, Readylift 
Suspensions Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-cv-00089 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2009). 
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substantive issues in these case [sic], particularly where they arise in the 
context of a complex, multi-patent case. 
Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) is one of ten defendants named in this 
case. Judge [E] owns common stock in Ford. Because of Judge [E]’s 
financial interest in Ford, he is required to recuse himself. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(b)(4). This conflict cannot be waived. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e). 
It is not clear that the claims against all ten defendants are inextricably 
bound up, and that the claims against each must be litigated in a single 
action. If Ford were not a defendant in this action, Judge [E] would of 
course proceed.  
If Ford remains a defendant in this action after ten days, Judge [E] will 
recuse himself.65 
The plaintiffs complied with Judge E’s hints and dropped Ford from the 
case.66 This clearly benefited Ford: even if the lawsuit would not have prevailed, 
Ford at least avoided further litigation costs. Indeed, this is the only example 
where we can confidently link a company’s favorable outcome to the judge’s 
portfolio. Nevertheless, we did not include the case in our count of recusal 
failures because Judge E did not preside over it until the plaintiffs eliminated 
the conflict. This example highlights that our count of recusal failures is not 
only conservative but also understates the scope of the problem because it does 
not account for unfair outcomes that technically comport with the law. 
Given these caveats, Part II explores the extent to which judges flouted 
statutory obligations and participated in cases where they had financial ties to a 
party. While the sample of judges is not random,67 the purpose of this study is 
to identify a practice rather than to make statistical claims about its prevalence. 
The study found that a surprisingly large number of judges flout recusal rules, 
and these findings are only the lower bound of such instances. 
II.  JUDGES FAIL TO RECUSE WHEN REQUIRED BY LAW TO DO SO 
Both the U.S. Code and the Code of Conduct are clear: judges must recuse 
themselves when they own stock in a party.68 The recusal statute requires a 
judge to disqualify himself whenever “[h]e knows that he, individually or as a 
fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial 
 
 65. Notice of Intent to Recuse at 1, Kruse, 2012 WL 12888668 (No. 10-cv-01066). 
 66. Kruse Technology Partnership’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Ford Motor Co. Without 
Prejudice Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) at 2, Kruse, 2012 WL 12888668 (No. 10-cv-01066). 
 67. Given the nonrandom nature of our sample, we do not attempt to claim any sort of statistical 
inference. 
 68. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (stating that judges must disqualify themselves from proceedings in 
which they have a financial conflict of interest); GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, CODE OF CONDUCT, 
supra note 34, at Canon 3(C)(1)(c) (stating that judges must disqualify themselves from proceedings 
in which they have a financial conflict of interest). 
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interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding[.]”69 
The recusal statute defines a “financial interest” as “ownership of a legal or 
equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other 
active participant in the affairs of a party”;70 the Code of Conduct tracks the 
recusal statute’s language on “financial interest” exactly. 71  Courts have 
interpreted the recusal statute as providing a bright-line rule that requires 
recusal whenever a judge has an “equity financial interest of any size.”72 But 
judges often cross this line. 
Our primary question is whether or not judges recuse when they are 
required by law to do so. While we defer a more fulsome analysis of the recusal 
statute and Code of Conduct, we note here that it is black-letter law that judges 
are required to recuse themselves whenever they own any amount of stock in a 
party to a case before them. We found that many judges did not meet even this 
minimal obligation: judges sometimes dismissed the case,73 rendered summary 
judgment,74 or remanded the case to state court.75 We go into greater detail 
below, but we want to stress that our analysis does not suggest that these judges 
were actually biased in any case. We do not intend to accuse any of these judges 
of bias or prejudice in any case or in any set of cases. Rather, we are simply 
reporting that these judges repeatedly decided cases when they had a financial 
interest that required recusal. 
 
 69. § 455(b)(4). 
 70. Id. § 455(d)(4). 
 71. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 34, at Canon 3(C)(3)(c); see 
also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n. 7 (1988) (noting that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455 “was amended in 1974 to clarify and broaden the grounds for judicial disqualification and to 
conform with the recently adopted ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C”).  
 72. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins., 343 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 73. See, e.g., Order Dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint at 2, Frederick v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 
No. 12-cv-00553 (E.D.N.Y June 5, 2012); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. 
CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2012, at 19 (2013) [hereinafter 
Judge G, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2012], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeGFinDisRep2012 
[https://perma.cc/S5FA-4BSG] (revealing that Judge G presiding over Frederick owned Wells Fargo 
stock in 2012). 
 74. See, e.g., Nat’l Builders & Contractors Ins. v. Slocum, No. 10-cv-00253, 2011 BL 194207, at 
*7–8 (S.D. Miss. July 26, 2011); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE 
U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011, at 5 (2012), 
https://tinyurl.com/FinDisRep2011 [https://perma.cc/KJ5Z-M2G7] (revealing that the judge 
presiding over Slocum owned stock in Regions Bank—an unnamed defendant in the case—in 2011). 
 75. See, e.g., Order Remanding Case to State Court at 5, JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA v. Ransby, 
No. 10-cv-01459 (N.D. Ga. July 9, 2010); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE 
U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 5 (2011), 
https://tinyurl.com/FinDisRep2010 [https://perma.cc/LB3B-N9AW] (revealing that the judge 
presiding over Ransby owned J.P. Morgan stock in 2010). 
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A. Examples of Recusal Failures 
Judges can fail to recuse in several ways. The first and most obvious is 
when judges are assigned a case involving a party in which they already own 
stock. For example, in November of 2009, a lawsuit against J.P. Morgan for 
wrongful termination was removed from state to federal court.76 The case was 
assigned to Judge F who owned J.P. Morgan stock valued at $15,000 or less in 
2009 and 2010.77 Instead of recusing himself, Judge F dismissed the case with 
prejudice in June 2010.78 
At other times, judges do not own stock when the case begins, but they 
purchase stock during the course of litigation. Take, for example, Capital One, 
N.A. v. Leser.79 At the beginning of the case, Judge G owned no Capital One 
stock, but she purchased between $15,001 and $30,000 of the stock less than two 
weeks before the parties settled. 80 Another example: Arriaga v. Wells Fargo 
Bank81 was assigned to Judge H, commenced on April 6, 2009,82 and ended in 
2013.83 Judge H’s 2009 and 2010 financial disclosure reports do not include any 
mention of Wells Fargo,84 so there is no indication that he should have recused 
 
 76. Klein v. J.P. Morgan Chase, No. 09-cv-06594, 2010 WL 2287485, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. June 1, 
2010). 
 77. See id.; COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2009, at 20 (2010), https://tinyurl.com/ 
JudgeFFinDisRep2009 [https://perma.cc/DNM5-AJKA]; COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. 
OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 
19 (2011) [hereinafter Judge F, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2010], https://tinyurl.com/ 
JudgeFFinDisRep2010 [https://perma.cc/5KPD-FQ2K]. 
 78. Klein, 2010 WL 2287485, at *2. Judge F did recuse himself in another case where he owned 
stock in a party. See Order of Recusal at 1, Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. CIBA Vision Corp., No. 10-cv-
06643 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2010) (stating that “upon review of the Court’s conflict list,” the case, 
which included Novartis as a defendant, must be assigned to another judge); Judge F, FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT 2010, supra note 77, at 8 (revealing that Judge F owned Novartis stock in 2010). 
 79. No. 10-cv-00393 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2010) (Bloomberg Law, 2d Cir., Dockets). 
 80. See Complaint at 1, Leser, No. 10-cv-00393 (indicating that Judge G was assigned 
to the case upon the filing of the plaintiff’s complaint in January 2010); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, 
ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR 
YEAR  2009,  at  21 (2010)  [hereinafter  Judge G,  FINANCIAL  DISCLOSURE  REPORT  2009], 
https://tinyurl.com/JudgeGFinDisRep2009 [https://perma.cc/T3NC-V7YF] (indicating that Judge G 
divested herself of all Capital One stock on October 23, 2009); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. 
OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 24 (2011), 
https://tinyurl.com/JudgeGFinDisRep2010 [https://perma.cc/E7PN-3VWR] (revealing that Judge G 
purchased Capital One stock on May 4, 2010, and May 5, 2010); Consent Order Settling Matter at 1, 
Leser, No. 10-cv-00393 (ordering, on May 17, 2010, that the matter be settled). 
 81. No. 09-cv-02115, 2013 WL 1303831 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2013). 
 82. Complaint at 1, Arriaga, 2013 WL 1303831 (No. 09-cv-02115). 
 83. Arriaga, 2013 WL 1303831, at *4. 
 84. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2009, at 4–14 (2010) [hereinafter Judge H, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT 2009], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeHFinDisRep2009 [https://perma.cc/WL57-4DN6]; COMM. 
ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR 
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himself during the first two years of litigation. But during October and 
November of 2011, while the case was ongoing, Judge H made four purchases 
of Wells Fargo stock.85 Judge H did not recuse himself and eventually granted 
summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo on March 27, 2013.86 This is one of 
seven cases involving Wells Fargo where Judge H failed to recuse himself 
despite owning stock in the company—at least as last recorded.87 Nor is Wells 
Fargo the only party with which a circumstance like this one occurred. While 
owning stock in each of the following parties, Judge H failed to recuse in four 
cases involving Deutsche Bank88 and four involving Ford, Pfizer, and General 
Electric.89 
 
CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 4–12 (2011) [hereinafter Judge H, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2010], 
https://tinyurl.com/JudgeHFinDisRep2010 [http://perma.cc/U3MW-ARP3]. 
 85. See COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011, at 12 (2012) [hereinafter Judge H, FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT 2011], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeHFinDisRep2011 [https://perma.cc/CN65-
WLJM]. Of the four purchases of Wells Fargo stock (denoted by “WFC,” the New York Stock 
Exchange stock symbol for Wells Fargo), three occurred on October 19 (two being valued at $15,000 
or less, and one being valued at between $15,001 and $50,000); the fourth purchase occurred on 
November 15 and was valued at between $15,001 and $50,000. Id. Judge H sold Wells Fargo stock in 
October and November; one sale was on October 20 (valued between $15,001 and $50,000) and the 
other was on November 15 (valued between $15,001 and $50,000). Id. We do not have Judge H’s 2012 
disclosure, so we do not know if he liquidated his entire position in the November sale. If so, Judge H 
might have been able to avail himself of the statutory divestiture provision of 28 U.S.C. § 455(f); 
however, it is not clear that purchasing shares in a party while litigation is ongoing would count as an 
“appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him” of a financial interest. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 455(f). 
 86. Arriaga, 2013 WL 1303831, at *4. 
 87. See Civil Docket for Case, Arriaga, 2013 WL 1303831 (No. 09-cv-02115) (showing Judge H 
presiding over case during October and November 2011); Civil Docket for Case, Wells Fargo Equip. 
Fin., Inc. v. Titan Leasing, Inc., No. 10-cv-04804, 2012 WL 6184896 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2012) (same); 
Civil Docket for Case, Hopper v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 11-cv-04121, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
140664 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2012) (same); Civil Docket for Case, Agri-Best Holdings, LLC v. Direct 
USA, Inc., No. 10-cv-06978 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2012) (same); Civil Docket for Case, Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A. v. Young, No. 11-cv-05198 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2011) (same); Civil Docket for Case, Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A. v. Chicalace, No. 11-cv-04819 (N.D. Ill. July 17, 2011) (same); Civil Docket for Case, Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Rosas, No. 11-cv-04336 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2011) (same); Judge H, FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT 2011, supra note 85, at 12 (showing Judge H owned Wells Fargo stock in October 
and November 2011). 
 88. See Civil Docket for Case, Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Fischer, No. 10-cv-06270 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 30, 2010) (showing Judge H presiding over case during September, November, and December 
2010); Civil Docket for Case, Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Batastini, No. 10-cv-05990 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 21, 2010) (same); Civil Docket for Case, Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Spradling, No. 10-cv-
05924 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2010) (same); Civil Docket for Case, Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. 
Palumbo, No. 1:10-cv-05293 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2010) (same); Judge H, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT 2010, supra note 84, at 11 (showing Judge H owned Deutsche Bank stock in September, 
November, and December 2010). 
 89. See Civil Docket for Case, Federico v. Freedomroads RV, 09-cv-02027 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 
2012) (showing Judge H presiding over case with Ford as a party); Civil Docket for Case, Simonian v. 
Pfizer, 10-cv-01193 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2011) (showing Judge H presiding over case with Pfizer as a 
party); Civil Docket for Case, Dearden v. Electro-Motive Diesel, 09-cv-05325 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 
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Another curious example occurred in Price v. J.C. Penney Corp.90 Rhonda 
Price sued her former employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
196491 for racial discrimination and retaliation after filing an official complaint 
with human resources.92 Judge I was assigned to the case in March 2012.93 Eight 
months into the case, he purchased J.C. Penney stock.94 He presided over the 
case for three more months.95 Only after the parties approached Judge I to 
inform him that they had reached an agreement to dismiss the case did Judge I 
inform them of his financial interest.96 The parties then signed a “Stipulation 
of Waiver of Conflict,”97 and Judge I dismissed the case.98 Although Judge I 
 
2009) (showing Judge H presiding over case with General Electric as a party); Civil Docket for Case, 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Sharp Corp., 09-cv-01104 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2010) (same); Judge 
H, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2009, supra note 85, at 5, 10; Judge H, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT 2010, supra note 84, at 5, 8, 11. Judge H’s financial disclosure reports (2009, 2010, and 2011) 
often do not indicate whether a sale of stock was a full or partial sale. Therefore, in researching Judge 
H, we assumed that Judge H liquidated his entire holdings in any given company on the last sell date 
mentioned in his financial disclosure report, unless otherwise indicated. 
 90. No. 12-cv-00138 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 8, 2013) (Bloomberg Law, 8th Cir., Dockets). 
 91. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000h). 
 92. Complaint at 2–3, Price, No. 12-cv-00138. 
 93. Id. at 1. 
 94. See id.; COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2012, at 4 (2013) [hereinafter Judge I, FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT 2012], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeIFinDisRep2012 [https://perma.cc/FQ5Z-
3MWL] (showing that Judge I purchased J.C. Penney stock on November 29, 2012—approximately 
eight months after Judge I was assigned to the case). 
 95. See Order Dismissing Case at 1, Price, No. 12-cv-00138 (showing Judge I continued presiding 
over the case for three months after his purchase of J.C. Penney stock until dismissing the case on 
March 8, 2013). 
 96. See Unopposed Motion to Dismiss at 1, Price, No. 12-cv-00138 (showing that parties to the 
case reached an agreement on March 6, 2013); Joint Stipulation of Waiver Conflict at 1, Price, No. 12-
cv-00138 (indicating that Judge I informed parties on March 7, 2013, of a conflict due to J.C. Penney 
stock ownership). 
 97. Joint Stipulation of Waiver Conflict, supra note 96, at 1 (showing the parties waived Judge I's 
conflict on March 8, 2013). This is not a common docket entry. We searched “Stipulation of 
Waiver of Conflict of Interest” in several databases. Westlaw and Google Scholar returned no 
such instances. Bloomberg Law returns one result. See Results for Dockets, BLOOMBERG L., 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/search/results/2ac9bb85392e0745358bcc6c566f0984 
[https://perma.cc/CY98-47V5 (staff-uploaded dark archive)] (showing that the results of a Bloomberg 
Law search for “Stipulation of Waiver of Conflict of Interest” includes WC McQuaide Inc. v. Able 
Trucking, No. 2002-cv-00459 (Ohio Comm. Pleas Apr. 26, 2002) (Bloomberg Law, Ohio, Dockets)). 
Note, the American Bar Association’s Model Judicial Code of Conduct states that judges “may disclose 
on the record the basis of the judge’s disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to 
consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification.” 
MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2 r. 2.11(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicia
l_conduct/model_code_of_judicial_conduct_canon_2/rule2_11disqualification/ 
[https://perma.cc/PZ4X-AWZR]. However, this ability to disclose and permit waiver of 
disqualification does not apply to judges with financial conflicts of interest. See infra notes 100–02 and 
accompanying text. 
 98. Order Dismissing Case, supra note 95, at 1 (showing Judge I dismissed the case on March 8, 
2013). 
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should have recused months earlier after purchasing the J.C. Penney shares—
or divested his interest in the company—disclosing to the parties and securing 
their agreement might have seemed reasonable under the circumstances. The 
problem is that it was illegal. 
Section 455(e) of the recusal statute explicitly forbids judges from 
accepting “waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection 
(b)” of the statute.99 That subsection is the part of the rule that requires recusals 
for financial interests such as stock ownership.100 While waivers might represent 
a reasonable alternative to recusals which strain the court system and delay 
litigation, the recusal statute unambiguously prohibits such waivers.101 
A different illegal maneuver occurred in Meluch v. Ford Motor Co. 102 
Originally assigned to Judge J, the case was transferred when the judge, who 
held Ford stock, 103  recused himself. 104  It passed through at least one other 
judge105 until, remarkably, Judge J requested it back.106 The order reassigning 
the case back to Judge J explained that he “was mistaken about a conflict and 
. . . requested the matter be returned to his docket.” 107  The request was 
granted.108 It should not have been. 
For one, Judge J still owned stock in Ford,109 which should have precluded 
his participation in the case.110 Even if he really had been mistaken, however, 
Judge J was no longer able to participate. Multiple circuit court opinions have 
held that a judge who disqualifies himself may not vacate the recusal order and 
participate at a later time. 111  Indeed, to do so creates an appearance of 
impropriety, whether the initial recusal was warranted or not. 
 
 99. 28 U.S.C. § 455(e). 
 100. Id. § 455(b)(4), (d)(4). 
 101. Id. § 455(e). 
 102. No. 10-cv-00651 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2010) (Bloomberg Law, 6th Cir., Dockets). 
 103. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 8 (2011) [hereinafter Judge J, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT 2010], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeJFinDisRep2010 [https://perma.cc/T9LT-A95Y]. 
 104. Order of Recusal at 1, Meluch, No. 10-cv-00651. 
 105. Order of Reassignment at 1, Meluch, No. 10-cv-00651. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.; Judge J, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2010, supra note 103. 
 110. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). 
 111. E.g., Moody v. Simmons, 858 F.2d 137, 143 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that, after recusal, a judge 
“is limited to performing ministerial duties necessary to transfer a case to another judge (including the 
entering of ‘housekeeping’ orders)”); Arnold v. E. Air Lines Inc., 712 F.2d 899, 904 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(“Patently a judge who is disqualified from acting must not be able to affect the determination of any 
cause from which he is barred.”); Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 456–57 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that a judge erred in vacating the recusal order after recusing herself); McCuin v. Tex. Power 
& Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1261 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that permitting a disqualified judge to assign 
the case “would violate the congressional command that the disqualified judge be removed from all 
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A final interesting pair of examples are Hutchinson v. J.P. Morgan Chase 
Bank112 and Bae v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.113 These cases raise a distinct but 
related problem within the recusal framework. While presiding over both cases, 
Judge K owned stock in J.P. Morgan Chase, which should have disqualified 
him. 114 He remanded the first case back to state court 115 and dismissed the 
second.116 After disposing of both cases, Judge K recused himself.117 His orders, 
both using identical language, are worth considering in full: 
It now has come to Judge [K]’s attention that he had a small financial 
interest in JP Morgan at the time he closed the case. Judge [K] believes, 
since he was unaware of his financial interest, that his financial interest 
did not affect the outcome of the case nor could it be reasonably 
questioned that it did so. In any event, Judge [K] hereby recuses himself 
from this case because of his financial interest and this case will be 
reassigned to another judge in the event this case is reopened for any 
reason.118 
There is no reason to doubt that Judge K honestly did not know of his 
“small financial interest” in J.P. Morgan. And, to be fair, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) 
requires recusal whenever a judge “knows” that he has a financial interest.119 
Lacking knowledge, it is perhaps incorrect to charge Judge K with violating 
subsection (b)(4) of the recusal statute. 
If left there, however, the incentive problems are manifest. A judge can 
simply remain ignorant (or plead ignorance) and avoid any need to recuse. 
Since, as we argue below,120 the recusal statute is written to further the public 
legitimacy of the judiciary, its object is to eliminate instances where judges 
could be perceived to be biased. Allowing ignorance to be a full defense seems 
to undermine the intent of the recusal statute. 
 
participation in the case” and might also “create suspicion that the disqualified judge will select a 
successor whose views are consonant with his”). 
 112. No. 10-cv-00483 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010) (Bloomberg Law, 9th Cir., Dockets). 
 113. No. 09-cv-01127 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2012) (Bloomberg Law, 9th Cir., Dockets). 
 114. See § 455(b)(4); Order Remanding Case to State Court at 2, Hutchinson, No. 10-cv-00483; 
Order Granting Voluntary Dismissal at 2, Bae, No. 09-cv-01127; COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, 
ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 
8 (2011), https://tinyurl.com/JudgeKFinDisRep2010 [https://perma.cc/SZE8-L2F4]; COMM. ON FIN. 
DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR 
YEAR 2012, at 8 (2013), https://tinyurl.com/JudgeKFinDisRep2012 [https://perma.cc/FPF6-39C7]. 
 115. Order Remanding Case to State Court, supra note 114, at 2. 
 116. Order Granting Voluntary Dismissal, supra note 114, at 2. 
 117. Order of Recusal, Hutchinson, No. 10-cv-00483 [hereinafter Hutchinson, Order of Recusal]; 
Order of Recusal, Bae, No. 09-cv-01127 [hereinafter Bae, Order of Recusal]. 
 118. Hutchinson, Order of Recusal, supra note 117; Bae, Order of Recusal, supra note 117. 
 119. § 455(b)(4). 
 120. See infra Sections III.A–C. 
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The drafters of the recusal statute seem to have been aware of this 
problem. Subsection (c) of the recusal statute therefore says, “A judge should 
inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a 
reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his 
spouse and minor children residing in his household.”121 If Judge K’s lack of 
knowledge absolves him of guilt under subsection (b) of the recusal statute, it 
condemns him under subsection (c). 
To his credit, Judge K does not try to excuse his recusal failure. Instead, 
he argues that there is no reason to think he was actually biased in the case, yet 
he does not assert that this is the proper inquiry.122 His choice to recuse himself 
in this awkward way, if anything, speaks highly of his desire to follow the rules. 
The problem, though, is that he did not do so. Unfortunately, he is not alone. 
B. How Does Recusal Failure Happen? 
How is it that so many judges fail to recuse when they own stock in parties 
to so many cases? Systems are perfectly designed to achieve the results they get, 
and the recusal system is no exception. There are two parts to the recusal system 
we highlight now. The first is case assignment. Different districts handle case 
allocations differently, and seldom do courts publish detailed case assignment 
protocol. 123  Common administrative sense suggests courts use one of two 
approaches: (1) leave it to the judge to recuse as necessary, or (2) maintain a 
running log of judges’ disqualifying investments in the clerk’s office and ensure 
that conflicted judges are not assigned cases where there are conflicts. Indeed, 
our off-the-record conversations with former clerks suggest as much. In the 
second approach, the list of investments, of necessity, comes from information 
provided by the judge. If a judge fails to include an actual conflict or creates a 
conflict after the case has begun, the clerk’s office cannot provide any 
meaningful protection against conflicts. Conversely, if a judge notifies the clerk 
of a “conflict” that does not actually rise to the level of a conflict, the clerk’s 
office will almost certainly divert cases away from the judge that should not be 
diverted. 
When a recusal failure occurs, it is often impossible (at least from the 
outside) to determine where the breakdown occurred. The judge might have 
failed to notify the clerk’s office, or the clerk’s office might have missed the 
 
 121. § 455(c). 
 122. See Hutchinson, Order of Recusal, supra note 117; Bae, Order of Recusal, supra note 117. 
 123. See, e.g., W.D.N.C. Civ. R. 73.1(a) (“All cases shall be initially assigned to a United States 
District Judge.”); Frequently Asked Questions: How Are Judges Assigned to Cases?, U.S. DIST. CT. E. DIST. 
TEX., http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=faq/filing [https://perma.cc/8VX9-K5JW] (“In divisions with 
more than one judge, they are randomly chosen by a computer database, similar to a deck of cards. 
When one judge is assigned, the ‘cards’ are shuffled again for the next selection. The Clerk’s Office has 
no discretion in the assignment of cases.”). 
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judge’s addition to the list or the inclusion of a conflicted party in the case. In 
an attempt to uncover more, we emailed the clerk’s office in a district where we 
had identified a judge with dozens of failures to recuse while owning stock in a 
party.124 We did not mention our findings but merely asked whether the clerk’s 
office screened cases for conflicts or whether judges handled recusals 
themselves.125 The email we received in return was one sentence: “Our judges 
follow the code of conduct.” 126  Ultimately, failures to recuse fall solely on 
judges; it is their obligation to know their financial interests and to recuse 
accordingly.127 
A second and related system is the filing of annual financial disclosure 
reports under the Ethics in Government Act.128 The information is often dated 
by the time it is filed. Financial disclosures are not due until May 15 of the year 
following the year which the disclosure covers.129 For example, a judge presides 
over a case in February 2020 and an observer wants to detect a conflict. The 
observer could wait three months until May 2020 when the judge will file a 
financial disclosure, but that will be for the year 2019. The judge may have 
divested of a conflicting asset in January 2020—or purchased a conflicting 
asset—after the filing period for 2019 had closed but before presiding over the 
February 2020 case. An observer must wait until May 2021—fifteen months 
later—when the judge is required to file a disclosure for 2020 to determine the 
potential conflicts from February of 2020. This level of attention requires the 
existence of an observer who is especially diligent. 
Parties to a suit have the strongest incentives to detect and avoid 
potentially biased judges, but they are unlikely to press judges for recusals. If a 
party moves to recuse, it risks upsetting the judge, who might interpret such a 
motion as an accusation of bias.130 If the judge denies the motion, the party gains 
nothing and is left facing a judge whose impartiality the party just ostensibly 
questioned.131 While there is a process to contest a judge’s failure to recuse, such 
review is exacting and rarely granted, further disincentivizing litigants from 
seeking recusal.132 
 
 124. Email from Ben Johnson, Assistant Professor of L., Penn State L., to Annette Panter (July 
16, 2019, 11:23 AM) (on file with author). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Email from Annette Panter, Assistant to the Clerk of Ct., U.S. Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of 
Ill., to Ben Johnson (July 16, 2019, 1:11 PM) (on file with author). 
 127. 28 U.S.C. § 455(c). 
 128. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–111. 
 129. § 101(d). 
 130. See FLAMM, supra note 15, at 11. 
 131. Id. at 13. 
 132. The judicial review process involves filing suit against the judge and seeking mandamus, 
which in this case would be an order from a court to the judge compelling the judge to correct his 
earlier mistake. See, e.g., In re Cameron Int’l Corp., No. 10-30631, 2010 WL 2930736 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(“This circuit has recognized that the question of recusal is reviewable on a petition for a writ of 
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Parties would be especially loathe to make such a motion without solid 
information as to the judge’s actual financial links to a party. The dated nature 
of filings is obviously one hurdle they must deal with, but parties cannot get 
their hands on even dated disclosures without putting themselves in a similarly 
awkward position. Though disclosures are publicly available from the AO,133 
requests must provide the name, occupation, and address of the requestor.134 If 
requesting the information on behalf of another party, the requestor must also 
specify that person or organization.135 This information is then given to the 
judge and the financial disclosure report is released to the requesting party.136 
If requestors conceal this information, they are guilty of perjury.137 Accordingly, 
parties cannot even inquire as to potential disqualifying links without 
potentially risking judicial reprisal. 
If judges are not intentionally violating the law, then they must be simply 
unaware of (or forget about) their holdings or existing conflicts with a company 
who is a party to the case. And assuming that sooner and more frequent filing 
deadlines would make judges more aware of and remember their holdings, the 
year-long lag time between filing deadlines—as well as the fact that the filing 
deadline is well past the end of the fiscal year—increases the likelihood that 
judges will be less aware of their financial holdings. In effect, the system is set 
up to fail. 
III.  JUDGES HAVE VERY DIFFERENT RECUSAL PRACTICES 
A. Unclear Rules and Unhelpful Practices 
Even if the mechanics of the system were improved, the wide range of 
financial links between judges and parties poses a problem. District court judges 
have obligations to recuse under both the U.S Code and the Code of Conduct.138 
Recusal rules aim to imbue the judicial process with two fundamental 
characteristics: fairness and legitimacy. Recusal prevents not only actual bias 
(fairness) but also the mere appearance of bias (legitimacy). Of course, the 
general assumption here is that legitimacy-based recusals will be overinclusive 
 
mandamus. The writ, however, will not lie in the absence of exceptional circumstances, and the party 
seeking the writ has the burden of proving a clear and indisputable right to it.” (citations omitted)). 
 133. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. To review the request form, see ADMIN. OFF. 
OF THE CTS., Request for Examination of Report Filed by a Judicial Officer of Judicial Employee, U.S. 
CTS. (Dec. 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao010a.pdf [https://perma.cc/EV9T-
VGSE]. 
 134. See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 49–53. 
 136. Supra text accompanying notes 49–53. 
 137. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746; supra text accompanying notes 49–53. 
 138. See § 455(b)(4); GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 34, at Canon 
3(C)(1). 
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so that the system will be fair and legitimate, with the only drawback being 
decreased efficiency. We think this assumption misses something important. 
There is a trade-off between legitimacy and bias centered on an often-
overlooked feature of our system, namely the random assignment of judges. 
B. The Fairness-Legitimacy Trade-off 
If a judge stands to profit from one side’s victory and that knowledge 
influences their decisions, such bias is unfair to the parties. However, if nobody 
knows about this motivation, it poses little threat to the legitimacy of the system 
since legitimacy rests on public perception. On the other hand, suppose a 
judge’s spouse owns stock in a company. The judge does not know this (despite 
the statutory obligation to remain informed of such financial interests), and so 
the judge treats this case just as they would any other. There is no unfairness, 
but if the public discovered that the judge in fact had a financial interest in a 
party to the case, the legitimacy of the system may well be imperiled. 
So understood, there is a difference between fairness and legitimacy, and 
the relationship between the two might not be obvious. Of course, the more 
unfair a system is, the more likely it is to ultimately be considered illegitimate. 
Still, the concern with legitimacy serves two important purposes. First, it offers 
an alternative rationale for applying and enforcing rules against judges other 
than concern over judicial bias. Second, it draws our attention to the distinction 
between fairness and legitimacy. Legitimacy depends on public perception, 
whereas fairness is an intrinsic trait of the system, independent of public 
perception. It is tempting to only focus on eliminating anything that might be 
considered “unfair” in a trial in order to bolster public perception of the process. 
But, as we will argue below, such efforts to make a system more legitimate might 
well make things less fair. 
1.  Fairness to Parties 
A key feature of our judicial system is the random assignment of judges.139 
Ideally, the outcome of the case would not depend on the judge assigned to it, 
 
 139. See United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992); J. Robert Brown, Jr. & 
Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1103 
(2000) (explaining that circuits attempt to insert neutrality into the judicial process through the 
implementation of a random assignment system for cases and judges); Katherine A. Macfarlane, The 
Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern District of New York’s “Related Cases” Rule Shaped 
Stop-and-Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 199, 205 (2014) (“Not only is random assignment 
assumed to be the status quo, it is also a popular, venerated practice.”); Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky, 
“May the Odds Be Ever in Your Favor”: Lotteries in Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1036–37, 1042 (2015) 
(“[T]he variety of instances in which the law actually resorts to lotteries is overwhelming.”); Adam M. 
Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1, 47 (2009) (“[M]ost adjudicators 
now embrace randomization within their own institutions: they commonly use lotteries to assign 
incoming cases to each other.”). Some authors are skeptical of the benefits of random assignment. See, 
e.g., Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 291, 291 
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but in practice, this has not been the case. Insofar as different judges have 
different views of law, proclivities for admitting evidence, thresholds for 
granting summary judgment, or other procedural tendencies that can impact 
outcomes, the judge that parties draw may significantly affect the likely 
outcome of a case. 
While it cannot be guaranteed that every case will be treated the same by 
a judge, random assignment effectively guarantees that every case has an equal 
chance to be decided by any judge. Thus, while the ultimate judicial assignment 
might tilt the probable outcome of a given case, random assignment flattens out 
the judicial idiosyncrasies at the beginning of the process.140 In short, fairness is 
proffered at the assignment stage because it is harder to ensure at the trial 
stage.141 
Recusals pose a strong theoretical challenge to this system. Suppose there 
are two types of judges. Type One judges tend to grant motions to dismiss and 
invest in large blue-chip financial companies. Type Two judges are more likely 
to let cases move to discovery and to invest in index funds.142 If an individual 
sues a large bank, for example, there is a much greater chance that Type One 
judges will recuse because of their financial ties to large financial companies. 
This would mean the remaining Type Two judges are less or not biased along 
the “big-company” dimension. However, the remaining Type Two judge pool 
will be biased along the “claims-dismissal” dimension, in that parties are more 
likely to draw a Type Two judge who rarely grants motions to dismiss. 
Fairness requires that cases be heard by judges who do not have a financial 
stake in the outcome. If operating well, the recusal system should effectively 
remove biased judges from the pool either ex ante (by having the clerk remove 
them from the pool) or ex post (by the judges recusing). The challenge is that 
if certain recused judges are removed, the makeup of the pool could change in 
ways that may also be unfair. 
Contrast three possible situations when a case is assigned to a judge. First, 
a judge is actually biased, but nobody knows this, and they do not recuse. Then 
the subsequent proceedings are unfair though they appear legitimate. Second, 
the judge has a disqualifying financial interest that does not actually bias them, 
people know about it, but they do not recuse. This threatens the system’s 
 
(2000) (“[T]he random selection of judges creates other serious problems for the judiciary . . . .”); 
Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 215, 215 (1999) (suggesting the United States end the practice of randomly assigning judges). 
 140. Cf. Brown & Lee, supra note 139, at 1041–43 (discussing fairness at the appellate stage). 
 141. See id. 
 142. Index funds do not entail equity ownership of the underlying securities. James Chen, 
Guide to Index Fund Investing, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/indexfund.asp 
[https://perma.cc/RVA6-W2XA] (last updated May 23, 2020). Therefore, they do not amount to 
financial interests requiring recusal. See United States v. Ala. Power Co., No. 01-CV-152, 2014 WL 
467519, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 5, 2014). 
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legitimacy even though the judge was fair. Third, the judge has a disqualifying 
financial interest that does not bias them, but they follow the rules and recuse. 
This preserves legitimacy, but it could make the system less fair because it 
changes the composition of the pool of judges who may hear the case. Thus, 
preserving the legitimacy of the system may actually introduce unfairness if it 
changes the probability of parties drawing a certain “type” of judge. 
In this way, varying interpretations of recusal requirements, which are 
likely to emerge when the recusal statute is unclear, are importantly different 
from a diversity of views regarding legal interpretation. When a case turns on 
a point of law, parties understand ex ante that judges will differ in how they 
interpret legal materials. Parties accept this fact because they had a fair shot at 
getting a range of different interpretations from different judges through 
random assignment and because the parties believe the judge does not have a 
rooting interest—much less a financial stake—in the case. But when judges 
follow different rules of recusal, random assignment fails and the parties are 
more likely to think judges are biased. Put differently, random assignment and 
procedurally unbiased judges are what make differing judicial tendencies (in 
other words, substantive bias) tolerable. 
This analysis applies to all recusals. Anytime a judge recuses, they alter 
the probabilities of parties being assigned a particular judge. This is a cost the 
system is willing to pay in order to avoid the larger cost of deploying a judge 
plausibly perceived to be biased in a given case. Thus, any recusal is costly in 
terms of undermining the random assignment of judges, but some are necessary. 
If a judge recuses when they need not, then the cost is unnecessary and wrong. 
To be sure, there are other features of our judicial practice that create similar 
problems. 143 However, the existence of other problems does not justify the 
creation of new ones. 
2.  Fairness to Judges 
Random assignment not only legitimates the process for litigants in a 
given case, but it also roughly equalizes the burden across judges. Random 
selection is designed to create a process where judges cannot control the types 
of cases they draw. Specifically, the probability that any given judge is assigned 
to a case should be independent of the characteristics of that case.144 Random 
 
 143. For example, senior judges only take certain types of cases. Frederic Block, Senior Status: An 
“Active” Senior Judge Corrects Some Common Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 533, 540–41 
(2007). Indeed, scholars and litigants have been concerned about institutional deviations from random 
assignment for years. See, e.g., Brown & Lee, supra note 139; Jonathan L. Entin, The Sign of “The Four”: 
Judicial Assignment and the Rule of Law, 68 MISS. L.J. 369, 370–74 (1998); Dane Thorley, Randomness 
Pre-considered: Recognizing and Accounting for “De-Randomizing” Events When Utilizing Random Judicial 
Assignment, 17 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 342, 342 (2020). 
 144. Ideally, the judge should not affect the outcome of the case since, in theory, judges are all 
applying the same law. That is, we would like to imagine judges as umpires. See Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, 
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assignment also makes things fair for the judges. Since every judge has a similar 
probability of being assigned any given case, judges do not have to worry about 
being stuck with more than their share of tedious or complex cases.145 
Recusals directly upset this process. With recusals, case-specific factors 
affect the probability that a judge will be assigned a case. When a judge is 
recused from a case, the probability that they will decide the case drops to zero, 
which means that other judges have an increased probability of deciding the 
case. Parties in the case now have different probabilities of drawing a given 
judge than parties in other cases. Moreover, other judges now have a higher 
probability of drawing certain types of cases. This means judges may face an 
unfair distribution of work over time. Pity the poor judge who does not own 
bank stocks; they must deal with all of the mortgage cases. 
Worse, judges might be able to use the recusal rules to game the system. 
For instance, a judge who did not want to see another mortgage document in 
the wake of the financial crisis could simply buy shares of Bank of America, 
Wells Fargo, J.P. Morgan, or another major mortgage lender, and be summarily 
recused from most mortgage cases. Thus, recusal rules might create bad 
incentives for judges that could lead to behavior that makes the system less fair 
for everyone. And even if this behavior is unlikely, the potential for it to occur 
may affect public perception and decrease legitimacy. 
The concern about upsetting the probabilities of parties being assigned a 
particular judge is not merely theoretical. If only a single judge in a large district 
owns a particular company’s stock and is summarily removed from the pool, 
this removal will not have a large effect on the probabilities. In practice, 
however, the number of judges with financial conflicts can be so great that very 
few judges in a district can preside over certain cases.146 Such a circumstance 
substantially upsets random assignment and can create substantial delays in 
litigations. Consider, for example, Eshterhardi v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, 
LLC,147 a case from the Central District of California.148 Even though the case 
 
The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113, 114–17 (2010) 
(tracing the lineage of the analogy). But just as umpires have different strike zones, judges apply rules 
inconsistently. 
 145. We do not assume case assignments are distributed independently or uniformly. For instance, 
if several cases involve the same underlying facts, subsequent cases should be assigned to the initial 
judge in the interest of judicial economy; thus assignment is not independent across cases. Similarly, 
if one judge has a full docket, then another judge with more room on the schedule should get the case; 
thus there is not a uniform distribution. In our view, legitimacy does not depend on independent draws 
from a uniform distribution. Instead, it requires that the features of the case itself should not affect the 
likelihood of drawing a particular judge. 
 146. See JOHNSON & PARTON, supra note 23; infra notes 198–200 and accompanying text. 
 147. 11-cv-07866 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2012) (Bloomberg Law, 9th Cir., Dockets). 
 148. Id. at 1. 
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involved only a single named defendant, six judges had to recuse themselves 
from or reassign the case before a seventh judge was able to hear it.149 
Judge L was assigned to the case first.150 He recused himself in October 
2011 because he held less than $15,000 of stock in Citigroup, Inc., which, along 
with Morgan Stanley, owned Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC.151 The case 
then went to Judge M, who recused in November because he held less than 
$15,000 of Morgan Stanley stock.152 The case was then assigned to Judge N who 
recused in December citing his and his family members’ interests in both 
Morgan Stanley and Citigroup.153 Judge N’s own financial disclosure reports 
show ties with Morgan Stanley, but not any that demand recusal under 28 
U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).154 
From there, the case went to Judge O, who recused himself, citing “a 
financial interest in one of the parties.”155 Although he held $15,001–$50,000 in 
a Morgan Stanley money market account, $50,000–$100,000 in a Citibank 
account, and $150,002–$350,000 in Smith Barney money funds and its bank 
deposit program, his financial disclosure reports do not include assets that 
would be considered financial interests under 28 U.S.C. § 455 or that would 
otherwise generate recusal obligations.156 Nevertheless, Judge O recused, and 
 
 149. See infra notes 150–60 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Order to Reassign Case Due to Self-Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 
08-05 at 1, Eshterhardi, 11-cv-07866 [hereinafter Order to Reassign Case October 27] (showing Judge 
L as the presiding judge who recused on October 27, 2011). 
 151. See id.; COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011, at 5 (2012), https://tinyurl.com/ 
JudgeLFinDisRep2011 [https://perma.cc/A4XW-LB5P]. 
 152. See Order to Reassign Case October 27, supra note 150, at 1; Order to Reassign Case Due 
to Self-Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05, at 1, Eshterhardi, 11-cv-07866 
[hereinafter Order to Reassign Case November 17] (showing Judge M as the presiding judge who 
recused on November 17, 2011); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE 
U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011, at 9, 26 (2012), 
https://tinyurl.com/JudgeMFinDisRep2011 [https://perma.cc/N2LD-MTBC]. 
 153. See Order to Reassign Case November 17, supra note 152; Order to Reassign Case Due to 
Self-Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05 at 1, Eshterhardi, 11-cv-07866 [hereinafter 
Order to Reassign Case December 14] (showing Judge N as the presiding judge who recused on 
December 14, 2011). 
 154. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. 
CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011, at 3–11 (2012) [hereinafter 
Judge N, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2011], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeNFinDisRep2011 
[https://perma.cc/BGU4-DRL9]. 
 155. See Order to Reassign Case December 14, supra note 153, at 1; Order to Reassign Case Due 
to Self-Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05, Eshterhardi, 11-cv-07866 [hereinafter 
Order to Reassign Case December 27] (showing Judge O as the presiding judge who recused on 
December 27, 2011). 
 156. See § 455; COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011, at 4–5 (2012) [hereinafter Judge O, FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT 2011], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeOFinDisRep2011 [https://perma.cc/7WLK-
UZYN]. 
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the case was reassigned to Judge P, who ordered that the case be reassigned 
without citing a reason.157 Her reports do not indicate any financial ties to the 
defendant.158 From there the case made its way to Judge Q, who recused herself 
in January because she had a stock interest of undisclosed value in Morgan 
Stanley.159 From there the case was assigned to Judge R, who was finally able to 
hear the case.160 
In this one case, one-sixth of the judges in the Central District of 
California recused themselves. 161  This is a very real problem for random 
assignment. But the problem was made worse because three of the six judges 
who recused did so despite not having a financial interest,162 as defined by the 
recusal statute and Code of Conduct,163 in any of the parties. 
C. The Need for Consistency 
The key feature of the fairness-legitimacy trade-off is that fairness and 
legitimacy both operate at a systemic level. The fairness concerns we identify 
are not limited to a biased judge in a particular case. Rather, there is also concern 
that the pool is biased before the case begins. Worse, the bias likely affects all 
cases since judges are constrained in how many cases they can take at any point 
in time. Suppose a judge owns several bank stocks. As a result, they decide a 
disproportionately low number of mortgage cases because they have to recuse 
so often. Accordingly, nonbank parties filing state fraud claims under the 
district court’s diversity jurisdiction are more likely to get this judge, at least if 
 
 157. See Order to Reassign Case December 27, supra note 155; Order Returning Case for 
Reassignment at 1, Eshterhardi, 11-cv-07866 [hereinafter Order Returning Case January 5] (showing 
Judge P returning the case to the clerk’s office for reassignment on January 5, 2012). 
 158. See COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2011, at 4–9 (2012), https://tinyurl.com/ 
JudgePFinDisRep2011 [https://perma.cc/LFA4-N73T]. Judge P’s year 2012 financial report is not 
available on Judicial Watch. See Document Archives, JUD. WATCH, https://tinyurl.com/ 
JudWatchJudgePArchives [https://perma.cc/44KK-D5JW]. Because Judge P did not officially recuse 
until January 5, 2012, the possibility exists that she acquired some stock that disqualified her. See Order 
Returning Case January 5, supra note 157, at 1. But rather than disproving our point, this would go to 
the problem of judges being able to escape cases they do not like by simply acquiring a financial interest 
in one of the parties. See supra text accompanying notes 145–46. 
 159. See Order Returning Case January 5, supra note 157; Order to Reassign Case Due to Self-
Recusal Pursuant to Section 3.2 of General Order 08-05, Eshterhardi, 11-cv-07866 [hereinafter Order 
to Reassign Case January 6] (showing Judge Q as the presiding judge who recused on January 6, 2012). 
 160. See Order to Reassign Case January 6, supra note 159; Order to Dismiss Entire Action at 2, 
Eshterhardi, 11-cv-07866 (showing Judge R as the presiding judge who dismissed the entire action). 
 161. See supra notes 150–60 and accompanying text (showing recusal of six judge). Using the 
Federal Judicial Center data, see id., wherein we identified thirty-six active and senior judges as the 
total number of available judges in the Central District of California in November of 2011. 
 162. See supra notes 150–60 and accompanying text (showing recusal of six judges). 
 163. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4); GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 34, 
at Canon 3(C). 
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districts work to keep the judge’s workload balanced. Thus, the nonbank parties 
face a biased pool because of recusals in different cases. 
Given the importance of random assignment to the system and the 
systemic effects of recusal decisions, recusal policy should be set at the system 
level, not left up to judges. If judges are free to apply different personal 
standards as to whether certain links are disqualifying, then the probability of a 
case being assigned to a judge is no longer set objectively by the system. Rather, 
the probability reflects the idiosyncratic private views of individual judges. 
For example, suppose there are two types of judges. Some judges are too 
quick to recuse, while others are too slow. Judges who are too quick rarely decide 
cases when parties might question their impartiality, but they also upset the 
random assignment process by improperly unbalancing the probability that 
cases are assigned to different judges. Judges who are too slow rarely upset the 
random assignment process, but they sometimes decide cases they should not. 
Implicit in this example is some Goldilocks rule that properly balances the costs 
of recusal against the costs of perceived bias, balancing fairness and legitimacy. 
In a world of perfect and complete information, judges, parties, and clerks 
would all know whether or not a judge would be improperly biased in a given 
case. Then biased judges could be removed from the pool and the random 
selection mechanism could possibly be reweighted so that the probability of 
drawing a judge more willing to grant discovery does not change as a result of 
the removal. 
But we do not live in a world of complete information, and we cannot 
observe bias ex ante. Indeed, judges themselves may be unaware of certain 
implicit biases. Certainly, the bar and general public will be unable to determine 
whether a judge was biased in a case, much less whether they will be biased in 
a future case. This reality makes it impossible to enforce judge-specific recusal 
standards. 
Judge-specific standards pose additional problems when observers 
compare across judges and cases rather than focusing on a single judge and case 
in isolation. If judges have different standards, consider a Judge Alpha who 
participates in cases where other judges would recuse because of some financial 
interest. Observers see not only that this potential conflict exists but also that 
other judges would recuse. This comparison makes Judge Alpha’s failure to 
recuse more suspect and increases the risk that observers will infer bias. They 
may think, “If all of the other judges would recuse, why is Judge Alpha so 
motivated to stay and decide this case?” Similarly, consider a Judge Beta who 
will recuse even when no other judge would. Judge Beta is now more likely to be 
perceived by observers (and other judges) as shirking work or perhaps trying to 
manipulate the types of cases they decide. Different standards, therefore, not 
only guarantee that errors are being made, they exacerbate the costs of those 
errors. 
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D. Unclear Laws and a Conflicted Committee 
Unfortunately, the law is not designed well enough to give us clear rules, 
and at times, the U.S. Code and Code of Conduct appear to conflict. For 
example, take Judge G who held stock in Wells Fargo when she was assigned164 
to Frederick v. Wells Fargo Bank NA.165 After her assignment to the case, but 
before she began participating, she sold off at least part of her interest in the 
bank.166 By selling, rather than recusing, it appears she attempted to invoke an 
exception provided by 28 U.S.C. § 455(f): 
Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this section, if any . . . 
judge . . . to whom a matter has been assigned would be disqualified, after 
substantial judicial time has been devoted to the matter, because of the 
appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to him or her, that 
he or she . . . has a financial interest in a party (other than an interest 
that could be substantially affected by the outcome), disqualification is 
not required if the . . . judge . . . divests himself or herself of the interest 
that provides the grounds for the disqualification.167 
The problem, however, is that Judge G had not yet dedicated “substantial 
judicial time” to the matter.168 In fact, she had dedicated no time to the matter 
at all. The recusal statute’s divestment exception, therefore, is arguably 
inapplicable. 
And yet, while Judge G arguably violated the recusal statute, Judge G did 
not violate the Code of Conduct.169 While the Code of Conduct reasserts much 
of subsection (f) of the recusal statute verbatim, it omits the language about 
“substantial judicial time.”170 Moreover, the Committee on Codes of Conduct 
has issued an advisory opinion essentially disposing of the substantial time 
requirement and sanctioning immediate divestment as a means to avoid recusal: 
The Committee believes that th[e] provision [permitting divestment] 
applies to cases in which a judge has already expended a substantial 
amount of time, cases in which a judge has expended no time, and those 
 
 164. Complaint at 1, Frederick v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, No. 12-cv-00553 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2012); 
Judge G, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2012, supra note 73, at 19 (showing Judge G owned Wells 
Fargo stock on February 3, 2012). 
 165. See No. 12-cv-00553 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2012) (Bloomberg Law, 2d Cir., Dockets). 
 166. See Complaint, supra note 164, at 1 (indicating Judge G was assigned to the case); 
Memorandum and Order, Frederick, No. 12-cv-00553 (reflecting the first participation of Judge G in 
the case as March 2, 2012); Judge G, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2012, supra note 73, at 19 
(showing Judge G sold at least part of her interest in Wells Fargo on February 16, 2012, placing the 
sale between February 3, 2012, and March 2, 2012). 
 167. 28 U.S.C. § 455(f). 
 168. Id.; see supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text. 
 169. See GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 34, at Canon 3(C)(4). 
 170. See § 455(f); GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 34, at Canon 
3(C)(4). 
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in between. Accordingly, if a judge learns of a disqualifying financial 
interest in a party before expending judicial time on the case, the judge 
may avoid disqualification by divesting himself or herself of the 
interest.171 
The Committee on Codes of Conduct’s interpretation presents several 
problems. For one, a judge who divests gives the appearance of wanting to 
decide the case, which suggests they are not disinterested.172 More concerning, 
however, is that the opinion expands the divestment exception beyond the 
narrow circumstance defined by the recusal statute.173 The Committee on Codes 
of Conduct is part of the Judicial Conference of the United States, whose 
membership is comprised entirely of judges subject to 28 U.S.C. § 455.174 In 
other words, the same judges who are bound by the recusal statute have decided 
that they are not actually constricted by parts of its language. 
The disagreement between the Code of Conduct and the recusal statute 
presents judges like Judge G with an uncomfortable dilemma: follow the recusal 
statute or follow the Committee on Codes of Conduct’s Ethics Advisory 
Opinions. We can hardly fault her for choosing the latter. But we believe that 
the lack of clarity that results from the disagreement—and the mere fact that 
judges subject to the recusal statute have also been positioned to expand its 
permissiveness—presents challenges to the perception of the judiciary as 
impartial. 
There are other instances where the Committee has taken permissive 
interpretations of the ambiguity in 28 U.S.C. § 455. A key question in the 
recusal statute is whether an asset is a “financial interest” or some “other 
interest.”175 The specific language mandates recusal when the judge: 
knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child 
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in 
 
 171. 2 JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, pt. B, § 220, no. 69 
(2019) [hereinafter GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, ETHICS ADVISORY OPINIONS], 
https://www.uscourts.gov/file/25673/download [https://perma.cc/44PH-4LWK]. 
 172. The Committee acknowledges this problem in the advisory opinion, speculating that 
“disposing of a disqualifying interest may under some circumstances create an appearance of 
impropriety.” Id. It then dismisses this possibility as “remote.” Id. 
 173. 28 U.S.C. § 455(f). 
 174. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., About the Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference/about-judicial-
conference [https://perma.cc/SV5A-L763]. “Membership is comprised of the chief judge of each 
judicial circuit, the Chief Judge of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge from each 
regional judicial circuit.” Id. Each of these judges is a “judge of the United States” for the purposes of 
28 U.S.C. § 455. See §§ 451, 455(a). 
 175. § 455(b)(4). 
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controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that 
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.176 
Notice that subsection (b) of the recusal statute requires that the judge 
disqualify himself for having any “financial interest,” but requires 
disqualification for “other interest[s]” only if the case outcome could 
“substantially affect[]” that interest.177 Consistent with the recusal statute, the 
Code of Conduct requires a judge to disqualify themselves whenever “the 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 178  This includes 
“instances in which . . . the judge knows that the judge . . . has a financial 
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or 
any other interest that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the 
proceeding.” 179  Here again we see the distinction between “financial” and 
“other” interests and the different treatment of the two. 
Given the special treatment of “financial interests,” it is important to 
understand what a “financial interest” (defined as “ownership of a legal or 
equitable interest”) in a party actually is.180 It is almost universally understood 
that this language requires recusal whenever a judge owns stock181 in a party to 
the case before the judge.182 Beyond this, however, things are unclear. Many 
other types of financial links would give judges a financial stake in a party. 
Consider a few concrete examples. 
1.  Should Judges Recuse when They Own Bonds? 
In August 2012, while presiding over Barrionuevo v. Chase Bank,183 Judge 
T purchased bonds worth between $50,001 and $100,000 issued by J.P. Morgan 
Chase. 184  Similarly, Judge U participated in many cases involving Bank of 
America while owning between $100,001 and $250,000 worth of bonds issued 
by the bank.185 Over the period 2010–12, Judge V dismissed a suit against Walt 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 34, at Canon 3(C)(1). 
 179. Id. at Canon 3(C)(1)(c). 
 180. Id. at Canon 3(C)(1)(c), 3(C)(3)(c). 
 181. To our knowledge, a possible distinction between common and preferred stock has never been 
explored in case law or secondary sources. 
 182. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins., 343 F.3d 120, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2003); 
FLAMM, supra note 15 at 238–39. 
 183. 885 F. Supp. 2d 964 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
 184. See Reassignment Order, Barrionuevo, 885 F. Supp. 2d 964 (No. C-12-0572) (indicating that 
the case was reassigned to Judge T on February 27, 2012); Barrionuevo, 885 F. Supp. 2d at 964 
(showing Judge T as the judge at the conclusion of the case when it was decided on August 6, 
2012); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2012, at 12 (2013), https://tinyurl.com/JudgeTFinDisRep2012 
[https://perma.cc/PXC4-M5BJ]. 
 185. See Civil Docket for Case, Aainfinity v. Bank of America, No. 10-cv-01741 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 
10, 2010) (showing Judge U presiding over case during November 2010); Bisson v. Bank of America, 
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Disney,186 presided over a case against J.P. Morgan,187 and dismissed a third 
against HSBC Bank.188 What makes these three cases notable is that Judge V 
owned Disney bonds when he dismissed the case against Disney;189 he owned 
J.P. Morgan bonds when he presided over the case against J.P. Morgan;190 and 
he owned between $100,001 and $250,000 worth of HSBC bonds when he 
dismissed the case against HSBC.191 
One need not accuse any of these judges of actual bias to worry about the 
appearance of impropriety; a party who litigates in front of a judge with a six-
figure stake in the other side might not feel that the process was entirely fair. 
We should also worry that the broader public might lose confidence in the 
judiciary if such practices became widely known. 
Treating debt investors (bond holders) and equity holders (stock holders) 
differently ignores that both are stakeholders in a company. In both instances, 
the judge has put money behind the company and stands to benefit if the 
company does well. The investments differ in that debt investors choose safer 
and more stable payouts, while equity holders accept more risk for potentially 
higher rewards.192 But in either case, the investor is betting on the company. 
 
N.A., No. 11-cv-01969 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2012) (showing Judge U presiding over the case 
between January and April 2012); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE 
U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 6 (2011), 
https://tinyurl.com/JudgeUFinDisRep2010 [https://perma.cc/LU62-SUCX] (showing Judge U 
purchasing Bank of America bonds in July 2010 and owning those bonds through the end of the calendar 
year); COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2012, at 6 (2013), https://tinyurl.com/JudgeUFinDisRep2012 
[https://perma.cc/M4BJ-XTDZ] (showing Judge U owning Bank of America bonds for the entirety of 
2012). 
 186. Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice Pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) at 1, 
Franzen v. Walt Disney World Co., No. 10-cv-01585 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010). 
 187. Order of Dismissal at 1, Chacon v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. 11-cv-05660 (E.D.N.Y. June 
26, 2012) (showing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as a defendant until March 19, 2012). 
 188. Rule 41 Stipulation of Dismissal at 1, Schiavello v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 11-cv-
02998 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2012). 
 189. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2010, at 11 (2011), https://tinyurl.com/JudgeVFinDisRep2010 
[https://perma.cc/N3VP-SA7G] (showing Judge V owned Disney bonds during the time he dismissed 
the case against Disney). 
 190. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2012, at 6 (2013), https://tinyurl.com/JudgeVFinDisRep2012 
[https://perma.cc/6XD8-SWZC] (showing Judge V owned J.P. Morgan bonds during the time he 
presided over the case against J.P. Morgan). 
 191. Id. at 8 (showing Judge V owned HSBC bonds during the time he dismissed the case against 
HSBC). 
 192. J.B. Maverick, Debt Market vs. Equity Market: An Overview, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/071415/what-are-differences-between-debt-and-equity-
markets.asp [https://perma.cc/5SN8-P92Z] (last updated June 25, 2019). 
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Moreover, bonds, just like stocks, are tradeable financial instruments.193 
The price of a bond reflects (in part) the likelihood that the borrower will be 
able to make the scheduled payments.194 If the judge owns bonds issued by the 
plaintiff, judgment in favor of the plaintiff makes it marginally more likely that 
the plaintiff will be able to pay its obligations. This theoretically lowers the 
credit risk and raises the value of the bonds. The effect is muted compared to 
equity, but it is still there. In light of the recusal statute’s insistence that any 
investment, “however small,” is enough to trigger a disqualifying financial 
interest,195 that the effect size is smaller would appear irrelevant. 
And yet, when judges own a party’s debt, such recusal is generally 
understood not to be mandatory. 196  Debt investments are treated very 
differently than equity investments. The relevant advisory opinion on the Code 
of Conduct (the “Debt Advisory Opinion”) asserts that since traditional debt 
investments do not convey an ownership interest, such investments do not 
create a financial interest in the relevant party.197 
This view was dispositive in In re Cameron International Corp.198 This case 
was an appeal to the Fifth Circuit in the course of the litigation following the 
BP Deepwater Horizon disaster.199 Judge W was the judge in over forty of the 
cases emerging from the disaster because so many other district judges had to 
recuse themselves.200 In the course of litigation, Judge W discovered that he 
owned debt issued by Halliburton and Transocean, two parties to the 
litigation. 201  Though the judge immediately disclosed and sold off those 
securities, defendants moved for recusal anyway.202 The Fifth Circuit followed 
the Debt Advisory Opinion and determined that, since debt instruments do not 
create an ownership interest, such securities are not financial interests in a party 
 
 193. See Chizoba Morah, Bond Market vs. Stock Market: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/09/difference-between-bond-stock-market.asp 
[https://perma.cc/2MRB-8BSB] (last updated Sept. 22, 2020). 
 194. James Chen, Bondholder Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/ 
bondholder.asp [https://perma.cc/8SXQ-K63D] (last updated Aug. 26, 2020). 
 195. 28 U.S.C. §455(d)(4). 
 196. See, e.g., In re Cameron Int’l Corp., 393 F. App’x 133, 135 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing GUIDE TO 
JUDICIARY POLICY, ETHICS ADVISORY OPINIONS, supra note 171, at no. 101 (“Debt interests are not 
considered to give rise to [a] financial interest in the debtor that issued the debt security because the 
debt obligation does not convey an ownership interest in the issuer.”)). 
 197. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, ETHICS ADVISORY OPINIONS, supra note 171, at no. 101. The 
Debt Advisory Opinion does make an exception for convertible debt. Id. If the bond can be converted 
into stock, then it does create a financial interest. Id. 
 198. 393 F. App’x. 133 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 199. Id. at 133–34. 
 200. Id. at 134. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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for purposes of the recusal statute. 203  The defendants petitioned the Fifth 
Circuit for mandamus, which the Fifth Circuit denied, finding “no error” in 
Judge W’s reasoning.204 
We question whether the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation is the best reading 
of the recusal statute for several reasons. First, this interpretation seems to 
render parts of the recusal statute surplusage. 205  Second, bondholders—like 
equity holders—are stakeholders in the company.206 Finally, there is no good 
reason, in this context, to treat debt differently than equity. The purpose of the 
recusal statute is best served by a bright-line rule requiring recusal when a judge 
has a financial interest in a party, whether that be an equity or debt interest. 
We begin with the argument from the rule against surplusage, which 
requires that every word or phrase be given effect.207 The recusal statute first 
defines financial interest in broad language and then carves out exceptions.208 
Following the rule against surplusage, we propose that the broad language be 
interpreted in a way that provides room for the subsequent carve outs to do 
some work, rather than accepting an interpretation that makes the carve outs 
functionally irrelevant. 
Applying the rule against surplusage to the recusal statute, the broad 
language at the beginning of the definition of financial interest cannot simply 
mean an ownership interest in the company itself through its stock. 209 For 
example, subsection (d)(4) of the recusal statute clarifies that “proprietary 
interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company” is not a financial 
interest in the insurer, nor is a “proprietary interest . . . of a depositor in a 
mutual savings association” a financial interest in the savings association unless 
the outcome of the proceeding could “substantially affect” the value of the 
 
 203. Id. at 135–36. The Fifth Circuit raised but did not address the possibility that the bonds might 
have created either a “financial interest in the subject matter in controversy” or that the judge might 
have to recuse because the value of the bonds “could be substantially affected by the proceedings.” Id. 
at 136 nn.7–8. The first of these would be a nonstarter because the Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower 
court that bonds are not “financial interests” because they do not convey ownership. Id. at 135–36. If 
bonds do not convey ownership of the party, they certainly cannot convey ownership of the “subject 
matter in controversy.” The latter possibility would also likely fail because the “however small” 
requirement of the recusal statute that imposes recusal obligations when a judge owns a “financial 
interest” would not apply to some “other interest.” See 28 U.S.C. § 455. Thus, unless Judge W’s 
holdings were notably excessive, it would be unlikely that the Fifth Circuit would issue mandamus 
relief. 
 204. Cameron Int’l Corp., 393 F. App’x. at 133–36. 
 205. On surplusage, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012) (“The surplusage canon holds that it is no more the 
court’s function to revise by subtraction than by addition.”). 
 206. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 126–55 (1995). 
 207. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 205, at 174. 
 208. § 455(d)(4). 
 209. See id. 
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judge’s interest.210 Taking out an insurance policy does not give a person an 
ownership interest in State Farm, nor does opening a checking account at Bank 
of America give a depositor an ownership stake in the bank. If a financial 
interest arises only when a judge owns stock,211 then there is no reason to make 
an exception for insurance policies or deposit accounts. 
For purposes of debt investments, however, the relevant carve out is 
subsection (d)(4) of the recusal statute, which says when a judge owns 
government securities, there is only a financial interest when “the outcome of 
the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities.”212 For 
instance, if a judge’s daughter receives a $50 U.S. savings bond for her birthday, 
the judge need not recuse himself in a case that could not “substantially affect 
the value of the” savings bond. Purchasing government bonds does not create 
an ownership interest in the governments that issue such securities. If debt 
investments in a party do not create financial interests in that party, then there 
is no reason to create this carve out for government debt. 
Notice that the exception does not address the “however small” language 
in the opening parts of the recusal statute definition.213 Instead, the exception 
says that in the case of government bonds—and only government bonds—the 
judge need not recuse unless the case could substantially affect the value of the 
securities.214 Therefore, the exception strongly implies that a judge who owns 
any amount of government bonds must recuse himself from a case that could 
substantively affect the value of the bonds. But this obligation would attach 
only if ownership of debt otherwise creates a financial interest. Similarly, the 
limitation to substantial effects on the value of the securities only applies to 
government debt.215 There is no such limitation for debt securities for private 
entities.216 Here again, the carve out in subsection (d)(4) of the recusal statute 
seems to imply that ownership of debt instruments does create financial 
interests in parties.217 
 
 210. Id. § 455(d)(4)(iii). The same carve out extends these exceptions to “similar proprietary 
interest[s],” which brings insurance policies from for-profit insurers and deposit accounts at for-profit 
banks under the exception. Id. § 455(d)(4); see also GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, ETHICS ADVISORY 
OPINIONS, supra note 171, at no. 26 (comprising an opinion titled “Disqualification Based on Holding 
Insurance Policy from Company”). 
 211. To be sure, the recusal statute also applies when the judge is a “director, adviser, or other 
active participant in the affairs of a party,” but we set these aside for the moment. § 455(d)(4). 
 212. Id. § 455(d)(4)(iv). 
 213. § 455(d)(4). Recall that the recusal statute defines a “financial interest” as “ownership of a 
legal or equitable interest, however small . . . .” Id. 
 214. Id. § 455(d)(4)(iv). 
 215. Id. § 455(d)(4)(i)–(iv). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
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It is also worth noting that the Debt Advisory Opinion is not consistent 
in its requirement of an ownership interest in a company.218 While ordinary 
bonds are not financial interests, convertible bonds—those that can be 
converted into stock—do count as financial interests.219 Convertible bonds can 
be converted into an ownership in the company, but they do not themselves 
convey ownership. 220  The Debt Advisory Opinion implicitly reasons that 
despite no ownership resulting from convertible bonds, different treatment is 
justified because the value of the convertible bond is inextricably linked to the 
value of the issuer’s stock.221 Similarly, the value of short positions and stock 
options would also be inextricably linked to the stock price.222 
We think the convertible bond guidance makes more sense. The relevant 
linkage is the one that might exist between the case outcome and the value of 
the security the judge owns. In the case of convertible bonds, the Debt Advisory 
Opinion sees an indirect link: the case could affect the value of the stock, and 
the value of the stock could affect the value of the bonds.223 But in the case of 
ordinary bond debt, there is also a direct link. 
2.  Short Positions and Options 
Consider the case Sokolowski v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. 224  Nancy 
Sokolowski sued the company on May 18, 2009 for sex discrimination, and her 
case was assigned to Judge X. 225 A little more than three weeks before the 
assignment, the judge had sold call options on Home Depot.226 In layman’s 
terms, Judge X stood to profit if Home Depot’s stock price went down, but 
stood to lose a potential limitless sum of money if the price of Home Depot’s 
 
 218. See GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, ETHICS ADVISORY OPINIONS, supra note 171, at no. 101. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. 
 221. See id. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. No. 09-cv-00915 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2009) (Bloomberg Law, 11th Cir., Dockets). 
 225. See Complaint at 4, Sokolowski, No. 09-cv-00915; Case Management and Scheduling Order at 
3, Sokolowski, No. 09-cv-00915. 
 226. COMM. ON FIN. DISCLOSURE, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2009, at 41 (2010) [hereinafter Judge X, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 
REPORT 2009], https://tinyurl.com/JudgeXFinDisRep2009 [https://perma.cc/M4P5-SVLL]. While 
owning call options on Home Depot, Judge X was assigned to and presided over Sokolowski. See 
Complaint, supra note 225, at 4; Judge X, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2009, supra; see also Order 
of Dismissal at 1, Sokolowski, No. 09-cv-00915. For readers unfamiliar with call options, see infra notes 
228–30 and accompanying text; Justin Kuepper, Call Option Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/calloption.asp [https://perma.cc/AS6A-W24Y] (last updated 
May 26, 2020) (“Call options are financial contracts that give the option buyer the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy a stock, bond, commodity, or other asset or instrument at a specified price within a 
specific time period.”). 
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stock rose. If we are concerned about the financial incentives of judges, the risk 
of unlimited loss is a relevant feature to consider. 
This example demonstrates that the recusal statute’s current focus on 
ownership interest is also too limiting when we consider even slightly more 
exotic financial positions. To see why, first imagine the financial exposure of a 
judge who owns stock in Ford Motor Company, which is the judge taking a 
“long position” in Ford, expecting the value will rise over time. Suppose a 
plaintiff sues Ford after a car crash. Does the judge have exposure? Certainly. 
If Ford has to pay a large judgment and the case sets a precedent for future 
plaintiffs, then Ford’s expected future profits will be lower and the price of Ford 
stock will be lower than it otherwise would be. If Ford loses, the judge loses. 
But if Ford wins, the uncertainty stemming from litigation (the possibility that 
Ford might have lost and its share price would have fallen) is resolved in Ford’s 
favor, and the share price should increase. Thus, if Ford wins, the judge wins. 
Now consider a judge who takes a short position in Ford. That is, the judge 
(through a broker) borrows a share of Ford from another investor and sells that 
share on the open market. Sometime in the future, the judge will purchase a 
share of the same stock in the open market to replace the borrowed share. If the 
market price of Ford stock falls during the interval of time between when the 
judge sold the borrowed share and when they purchased a share of Ford to 
replace it, they profit the difference between those two prices. On the other 
hand, if the market price of Ford stock increases in that interval, then the judge 
has to replace the borrowed share at this higher market price and make up the 
difference from their own resources. Basically, if Ford stock falls, the judge 
profits; if Ford’s stock price increases, the judge loses money. 
Now consider the judge’s exposure in the same trial. If Ford loses, then 
the share price should fall, and the judge profits. If Ford wins, then the share 
price should rise, and then the judge loses. The primary difference from the 
perspective of the judge’s financial exposure between a long position and a short 
position is that profit and loss switch. The switch also extends to the size of the 
gain or loss. Owning a stock has unlimited upside (if the stock price goes to 
infinity) and limited downside; you can only lose the money you paid for the 
shares and then only if the price goes to zero. On the other hand, if the judge 
shorts a stock, the judge loses (a possibly infinite amount of) money as the price 
goes up, but the upside is limited to what the judge makes if the price goes to 
zero. 
However, things are very different from the perspective of the legal 
obligation to recuse. Notice that when the judge owns Ford stock, they owns an 
equitable interest in Ford. When the judge shorts Ford, he never owns Ford 
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stock. If the recusal statute requires an ownership interest in Ford, then short 
positions are not “financial interests.”227 
The same is true in the case of options. Compare two situations: Judge 
Gamma owns a Ford call option, and Judge Delta owns a share of Ford stock. 
Owning a call option means that Judge Gamma pays a premium for the right to 
purchase a share of Ford at a predetermined price.228 If the price of Ford stock 
increases, the option to buy Ford shares at a predetermined, lower price is more 
valuable. If Ford’s share price falls, the option is worth less money. These 
dynamics are quite similar to owning Ford shares outright. Furthermore, since 
options are usually far less expensive than shares, they are easily used to amplify 
gains or losses.229 If Judge Gamma invests the same amount of money in options 
as he does in purchasing stock outright, his exposure to swings in the stock price 
is significantly larger. And yet, despite Judge Gamma’s greater exposure in 
comparison to Judge Delta, who owns a share of stock, Judge Gamma’s owning 
options does not convey an ownership interest and may not count as a financial 
interest.230 
3.  Liabilities and Investments in the Judge 
The U.S. Code and the Code of Conduct are both silent on situations 
where a party has a financial interest in a judge.231 For example, suppose a judge 
started a company named Greenacre Co. and that Acme Investments Ltd. 
(“Acme”) was an early equity investor. The judge would not have a financial 
interest in Acme and would therefore be permitted to hear a case in which Acme 
was a party, despite the judge being a debtor to Acme. 
A similar problem arises in the context of liabilities. If a party lends a judge 
money, this debt does not create a financial interest.232 Of course, the ability to 
 
 227. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4). A short position would still likely qualify as an “other interest” and 
the judge would have to recuse if the case outcome could “substantially affect” the value of the judge’s 
position. Id. 
 228. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 229. Using debt to acquire additional assets and thereby amplifying gains and losses is 
referred  to  as leverage. Harold Averkamp, What Is Financial Leverage?, ACCT. COACH, 
https://www.accountingcoach.com/blog/what-is-financial-leverage [https://perma.cc/5TJJ-5FYW]. 
For example, if an individual takes out a loan to purchase a piece of property, later sells that property 
for more than its initial value and the interest on the loan, pays off the remainder of the loan, and keeps 
a remainder as profit, they have successfully exercised financial leverage. Id. 
 230. One might think that since option prices should track stock prices, as convertible bonds do, 
the Code of Conduct might implicitly treat options as financial interests. However, that would, again, 
require the Code of Conduct to contradict its position in the case of ordinary bonds that an ownership 
stake in the company is required. 
 231. See § 455(d) (showing that no part of the recusal statute mentions a party having a financial 
interest in a judge); GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, ETHICS ADVISORY OPINIONS, supra note 171, at 
nos. 2–116 (revealing that not a single advisory opinion mentions a party having a financial interest in 
a judge). 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 175–82, 231–33. 
99 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2020) 
2020] JUDGES BREAKING THE LAW 39 
revise terms, forgive debts, or more strictly or loosely enforce covenants puts 
the lender in a position to directly affect the judge’s financial situation. In most 
cases, there should be no real risk that such investments by parties in judges 
should influence judges. However, the same is true of equity (stock) 
investments by judges. The point of the recusal statute is to draw a bright line, 
thereby eliminating situations that might suggest impropriety even when no 
actual impropriety is present. We now show that the line is not as bright in 
practice as it is in theory. 
E. The Same Judges Are Inconsistent in Interpreting Recusal Standards 
The lack of legal clarity seen above leads to a wide range of different 
recusal standards across judges. The only point of clarity is that judges must 
recuse when they own stock in a party.233 The Code of Conduct does not require 
recusal when judges own bonds issued by or financial derivatives tied to a 
party. 234  Still, some judges might agree with us that bonds constitute a 
disqualifying interest, taking a more conservative approach to the recusal statute 
and recusing when they own bonds. Interestingly, the same judge often applies 
a different standard in different cases.235 That is, variation exists both across and 
within judges vis-à-vis recusal standards when judges have a nonequity financial 
relationship with a party. 
Take Judge A from our lead example. He recused on June 12, 2012, because 
of his self-identified financial interest in Wells Fargo.236 But at that the same 
time, Wells Fargo had another case in front of Judge A that he would dismiss 
with prejudice on November 20, 2012.237 Similarly, Judge B, who recused on 
June 22, 2012, based on having a checking account, a savings account, and a line 
of credit at Wells Fargo,238 was also presiding over another Wells Fargo case at 
the same time and awarded final judgment in favor of the bank on September 
20, 2012.239 
Likewise, Judge N recused in part due to financial ties to Morgan 
Stanley.240 According to his 2011 disclosure, he invested in a Morgan Stanley 
 
 233. See supra note 181–82 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra Section III.D.1. 
 235. See, e.g., supra Section III.C; infra notes 236–46 and accompanying text. 
 236. Order of Recusal June 12, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 237. See, e.g., Order Denying Ex Parte Motion for Emergency Preliminary Injunction and/or 
Temporary Restraining Order Without Prejudice As Withdrawn, Gabriel v. Wachovia, No. 12-cv-
00106 (D. Colo. Nov. 29, 2012) (reflecting that Judge A was taking action in the case as early January 
of 2012); Final Judgment, Gabriel, No. 12-cv-00106 (showing that Judge A continued on the case until 
its termination in November of 2012); Lepro, supra note 57. 
 238. See Notice of Disclosure, supra note 20, at 1; Lepro, supra note 57. 
 239. See Final Judgment, Lewis v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 11-cv-03387 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 
2012). 
 240. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
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mutual fund in May and June of 2011.241 While this investment—one that the 
recusal statute expressly states does not require recusal242—was sufficient to 
push Judge N to recuse himself from our illustrative case,243 it did not stop him 
from deciding a separate Morgan Stanley case. 244  Indeed, Judge N began 
presiding over that case in March of 2011 and continued through September of 
that year.245 Judge N made the “disqualifying” investment in the middle of that 
case, but did not recuse himself, even though the same conflict motivated 
another recusal.246 
IV.  THE NEED FOR AND CHALLENGES TO REFORM 
So far we have pointed out that the current standards for recusal are 
unclear and make little sense. 247  Further, even when judges do have clear 
conflicts of interest, many judges often fail to recuse themselves.248 Systems are 
not well designed to guide judges in conforming to standards or to allow parties 
or observers to monitor compliance.249 We have also suggested that there should 
be a single, clear standard for all judges instead of the status quo that allows 
judges to recuse at their own discretion.250 That standard should balance the 
damage recusals cause to random assignment (fairness) against the risk of 
perceived or actual bias (legitimacy).251 
Reform could come from any of three places. First, Congress could revise 
the recusal statute. Second, courts (especially appellate courts) could find 
opportunities to provide a clear interpretation of the recusal statute. Finally, 
the Judicial Conference could amend the Code of Conduct. Each of these paths 
involves challenges. First, meaningful legislation is difficult to get through 
Congress.252 Second, the judicial path is complicated since the decision to recuse 
is not easily reviewable; it is effectively impossible to prevent judges from 
 
 241. Judge N, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REPORT 2011 supra note 154, at 5, 7, 9. 
 242. 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4). 
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recusing too quickly.253 The third option, a revision to the Code of Conduct, 
seems the most likely possibility, but such a revision would require judges 
implicitly rebuking their colleagues.254 
The more pressing question now is not who could implement reform but 
what reforms are needed. We have three distinct proposals. First, we would 
bring greater transparency to the process and centralize case assignment. 
Second, we would establish a single bright-line standard for “financial interests” 
that would more closely track a reasonable person standard for bias. Finally, we 
propose a Recusal Failure List that would identify judges who either fail to 
recuse when they should or recuse when they should not. 
A. Improved Transparency and Centralized Case Assignment 
The first step in reforming the recusal system is to make the recusal 
process more transparent. Transparency would help parties and observers catch 
recusal failures early. Doing so requires improving both the information 
provided and the mechanisms through which parties and observers can acquire 
information and present it to the courts. 
To that end, judicial financial disclosure reports should be more 
comprehensive. Currently, judicial disclosure reports have no place to include 
investors in enterprises controlled or managed by judges or their spouses.255 
Similarly, it is unclear whether the report would capture a judge’s other business 
relationships. If we do want to require recusal from cases where a judge uses the 
brokerage or wealth management services of a party, that information would 
need to be disclosed as well. Essentially, the problem is that the current financial 
disclosure report does not fully capture the range of financial relationships that 
may cause concern.256  
Second, these disclosures should be more public than the current system, 
which requires that court watchers formally request the disclosure, therefore 
immediately informing judges of the request. 257  Informing judges of those 
 
 253. See supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text. In theory, one could petition for mandamus 
to force the judge to hear the case. 
 254. The Code of Conduct mirrors the recusal statute. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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the Code of Conduct—for example, through a new advisory opinion—it would likely require 
overturning earlier opinions at a minimum. 
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 257. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
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requests may prevent parties from checking for conflicts in the first place.258 
Such an obstacle is counterproductive: judges and parties would benefit from 
greater disclosure. Well-meaning judges would be less likely to inadvertently 
participate in a case when they should not, and parties would be more confident 
that judges do not have a financial interest in the case. 
Third, judges should file disclosures quarterly rather than annually. This 
change would improve the accuracy of data available to the public and also help 
judges stay on top of their recusal obligations. It is unsurprising that judges 
forget what companies they listed on their financial disclosure reports a year 
prior. If they reviewed their disclosures quarterly, they would be far less likely 
to inadvertently preside over on a case they should not. 
Furthermore, stale reports pose a real problem. Many financial disclosure 
reports are not filed until May of the following year or later. 259 If a judge 
purchases stock in a company in January and that company appears before the 
same judge in March, that conflict may not be discovered for more than a year. 
This exacerbates the problem faced by parties who worry that a judge may have 
a conflict. If the only evidence of a financial interest is a report at least five 
months old—a May report announcing that a judge owned stock at the end of 
the previous year does not account for stock owned in the immediately 
preceding five months prior to filing—then parties will be hesitant to press the 
judge. Moving to quarterly financial disclosure reports would keep the 
information timely and useful. 
Fourth, these financial disclosure reports should be formatted to be more 
usable by scholars and observers. At the time of this Article, 870 authorized 
federal judgeships existed.260 There are simply too many reports to investigate 
by hand, and many disclosures are dozens of pages long.261 To facilitate study 
and monitoring, reports should be completed and stored electronically in easily 
exported formats. The data could then be automatically transferred to 
subsequent reports, making it easier for judges to file more frequently. 
Finally, the system would benefit from an anonymous reporting process 
for recusal failures. Lawyers who discover a potential conflict may be reticent 
to point it out to the judge. No matter how helpful their intent, lawyers may be 
rightly concerned that the judge will take their observation as an accusation. 
Instead, courts should institute an anonymous reporting system through which 
the parties or third-party observers can notify the judge, parties, and chief judge 
 
 258. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text. 
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of the potential conflict. This way, lawyers need not fear upsetting the judge 
when they report a possible recusal failure. 
Once the disclosure process is more transparent, centralizing case 
assignment should become easier through clerks’ offices removing conflicted 
judges from the pool. Judges would inform the clerk’s office of the list of parties 
where the judge would have to recuse, and the clerk’s office would remove the 
judge from the pool of possible jurists when those parties are involved.262 This 
type of centralization is an excellent first line of defense and should be standard 
across the federal courts. 
The clerk’s office can screen cases where the judge has a current conflict, 
but if the judge buys stock during litigation, or a party that generates a recusal 
obligation is added to the case later on, ex ante review would be an insufficient 
check. The clerk’s office would still be able to notify the judge of the conflict, 
and the judge could then divest, 263 although clerks may not catch every conflict, 
especially if judges exclude potential conflicts from their financial disclosure 
reports. Ultimately, recusal is still the judges’ responsibility. 
B. A Single Standard 
Increasing trust in the judicial system requires a single, clear standard. 
Such a standard would prevent judges who are outliers from being perceived as 
more biased or as shirking work. The question at hand is how to draw the line. 
First, we think that the simplicity and clarity of requiring recusal over any 
financial interest, “however small,” is worth keeping.264 But taking that standard 
to the extreme, a judge whose spouse owns $50 in stock is simply not going to 
be influenced by that financial holding. However, given the wide variation in 
the wealth of judges and the different sizes of investments, it is impossible to 
articulate a perfect standard. Though the “however small” standard can be 
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viewed as demanding, setting the bar at zero is simple and clear. We would 
maintain it. 
The real question is what should be considered a “financial interest.” In 
our view, the Judicial Conference should revise the Code of Conduct to classify 
as financial interests: (1) any financial asset, instrument, or position owned by 
the judge with a price that depends in whole or in part on the financial 
performance of the party; or (2) any asset, instrument, or position owned by a 
party that depends on the financial performance of the judge (or spouse or 
minor child living at home). These adjustments would bring bonds, short 
positions, options, and other financial interests previously not covered by the 
Code of Conduct into the automatic recusal category as well as instances where 
a party is an investor in a company owned or controlled by the judge. We would, 
however, leave the explicit exception for mutual funds. Judges should be 
allowed to make some investments without triggering recusal obligations, and 
mutual funds should be acceptable. Because these funds are intended to provide 
diversification, judges who invest in such funds are unlikely to pay attention to 
the individual securities in the funds. This limits both fairness concerns and 
legitimacy concerns from such investments. 
The more challenging question is what to do with funds, liabilities, and 
accounts. The Code of Conduct already requires judges to “refrain from 
financial and business dealings that . . . involve the judge in frequent 
transactions or continuing business relationships with . . . persons likely to come 
before the court.”265 Certainly regular mortgage or card payments would qualify 
as “frequent transactions” and quite possibly as “continuing business 
relationships.” 
With that said, judges need to be able to purchase homes, hold checking 
accounts, and conduct other basic financial activities. Also, since large financial 
institutions (notably Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and J.P Morgan) are both 
frequent litigants and highly likely to provide financial services to judges,266 
forcing recusals on these grounds would undermine random assignment. The 
few judges who would not need to recuse would be overloaded with cases 
involving big banks. It would also be unfair to those banks (and those who 
litigate with or against them), since the pool of judges available to hear their 
cases would be quite different from the regular pool.267 
Given these trade-offs, we think it wisest to follow the course set out by 
Congress268 and create exceptions for ordinary financial services like checking 
accounts, mortgages on the primary residence, credit cards, and IRAs. We 
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would, however, require judges to recuse when they have a brokerage account 
or use private wealth management services provided by a party. Similarly, we 
would prefer to see judges recuse when they have second mortgages or 
mortgages on investment properties. The difference to us is that brokerage and 
wealth management services create tighter relationships between the judge and 
the party due to regular communication with party employees. Similarly, these 
products provide ample opportunity for banks to provide benefits to judges 
(such as waiving fees) to possibly purchase goodwill. The point is not that they 
would be successful; rather, such a possibility risks the perception of bias. 
Similarly, a difference exists between a first mortgage on the family home and 
subsequent mortgages that may be putting additional strain on the judge’s 
finances. Funding real estate speculation, for example, or using the second 
mortgage to fund some other business venture or financial need, may give the 
bank an interest in the judge. We think that interest creates too large a risk of 
perceived bias. 
C. Recusal Failure List 
Finally, we propose that judges who preside over cases while conflicted 
should be named on an annual list. While an automated system would do much 
to limit recusal failures, it is not a complete solution. Judges might purchase a 
financial interest after litigation begins, parties may be joined late, or other 
circumstances (like inheritance or marriage) might arise that change the makeup 
of the financial interests at the time of the original conflict check. Ultimately, 
it is the judge’s responsibility to make sure that they are not conflicted. Naming 
judges who fail at this responsibility is a straightforward way to incentivize 
judges to do the right thing. 
The Six-Month List has been quite effective in speeding up judgments.269 
Some scholars think it may be too effective270 and are concerned that judges 
may be deciding motions or cases differently in order to get an opinion 
submitted in time. Complying with our annual list would not affect the outcome 
of any motion or case since compliance simply keeps a conflicted judge away 
from a case or a nonconflicted judge in it. The pressure imposed by the existence 
of the annual list operates before motions are filed. 
An annual list would be strong medicine for district judges looking to be 
elevated to the circuit courts. Regular appearance on the annual list would be 
easy fodder for opponents of such a nomination in the Senate. Further, circuit 
courts could use the annual list to limit district judges’ opportunities to sit by 
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designation on panels.271 Even if a district judge has given up on elevation, 
reputational and other professional incentives might be tied to keeping one’s 
docket in compliance with the law and one’s name off of the annual list. 
Therefore, a combination of improved processes applied to a clarified set of 
rules and enforced by such an annual list should be a marked improvement on 
recusal practice in the lower courts. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article reports the result of the first large-scale study of recusal 
practices by district judges. The study reveals several disconcerting results. 
First, dozens of judges have broken the law. In more than two hundred cases 
over a four-year period, district judges either ignored the statutory and ethical 
obligation to self-disqualify while owning stock in a party or failed in the 
statutory and ethical duty to be aware of their financial interests.272 
This lack of compliance complicates the second and larger problem—the 
rules governing recusal are insufficient and unclear. Right now, a judge who 
owns stock in a party has a financial interest in that party, but a judge who takes 
a short position in the same stock has no such financial interest. If a judge (or 
the spouse or minor child) takes an equity interest in a party, the judge must 
recuse, but if the party invests in a company controlled by the judge, there is no 
financial interest. The recusal statute and Code of Conduct say the judge cannot 
own stock in the party, but they say nothing about when the party owns a 
financial interest with the potential to affect the judge. In addition to these 
obvious gaps, the lack of clarity leaves judges to work out their own recusal 
practices. As we demonstrated, judges use vastly different standards for recusal. 
These divergent practices upset the random assignment of cases that is a 
key legitimating component of the judicial process. If judges recuse when they 
should not, they unfairly push work onto their colleagues and upset the 
probabilities parties face of encountering certain judges. Further, different 
recusal standards make outlier judges look bad. Those who are slow to recuse 
will appear as though they do not care about perceived bias. Those who are 
quick to recuse may appear timid or like they are shirking work. 
We suggest the best solution to these problems is a sweeping 
transformation of the standards and transparency-enhancing institutional 
reforms. Ideally, Congress would take the lead, but the task may instead fall to 
the Judicial Conference as it promulgates updates to the Code of Conduct. 
Either way, procedures should be automated and transparency improved; in 
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addition, there should be a single, comprehensive standard guiding judicial 
recusal due to financial relationships. Since judges frequently ignore the bright-
line recusal rule around stock ownership, however, we do not think that reform 
of the rules will be sufficient. To this end, we propose that judges who fail to 
recuse when they should or who recuse when they should not be named on a 
publicly available annual list. 
These findings and proposals are built on the first-ever study of a large set 
of district judges. Our findings are troublesome and surprising, and much work 
remains to better understand the extent of recusal failures and the effects of 
financial links between judges and parties. But we must face up to the fact that 
judges are breaking the law. 
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